Malthus, T. R. (Thomas Robert), 1766-1834; Malthusianism
That there was force in this reasoning appears from the way in which
Malthus received it when stated to him by letter a few months after the
publication of the essay. He replied that the “prudence” in question, if
existing in Godwin’s new society, would mean an eye to the main chance;
it would mean that one man is strengthening his position and getting to
himself more than the minimum of necessaries; if you prevent this, what
becomes of your freedom? if you do not, what becomes of your equality
and wealth? Secondly, the effect of the prudence would be that the
population would not be the greatest possible, but considerably within
the limits of the food; and yet you object to present society, that its
arrangements prevent the “greatest practicable population.” In all our
political theories, if we would trace to particular institutions the
evil that is really due to them, we must deduct the evil that is known
to be due to other causes. “The very admission of the necessity of
prudence to prevent the misery from an overcharged population, removes
the blame from public institutions to the conduct of individuals. And
certain it is, that almost under the worst form of government, where
there was any tolerable freedom of competition, the race of labourers,
by not marrying, and consequently decreasing their numbers, might
immediately better their condition, and under the very best form of
government, by marrying and greatly increasing their numbers they would
immediately make their condition worse.”[827]
This was no doubt a point against Godwin, but it was also a point
against Malthus himself. The essay in its first form had not made
sufficient allowance for “prudence”; and the introduction of moral
restraint in the second edition might very plausibly have been ascribed
by Godwin’s friends to Godwin himself, in spite of the elaborate reply
to the _Thoughts_ in a chapter afterwards dropped.[828] Godwin said to
him afterwards that he had no right to introduce a new element into his
solution of the problem, and pretend that it was the same solution as
before;[829] if he altered his premises he ought to alter his
conclusion. To which Malthus might have answered, that, though his
conclusion is altered, it retains its value as an argument against
Godwin. At first the tendency of numbers to increase up to the food was
described as an obstacle fatal to progress; now it is indeed an obstacle
which must be faced and overcome, but it is fatal not to progress, but
only to equality. Godwin himself had at first considered it an entirely
imaginary obstacle which might be ignored for the present by reformers;
and his very doctrine of prudence amounts to an admission that his view
of it had changed.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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