It must be emphasized that the development of higher ideals is due to the _natural_ capacity of humanity; the impulse is simply time-binding impulse. As we have seen, by analysing the functions of the different classes of life, every class of life has an impulse to exercise its peculiar capacity or function. Nitrogen resists compound combinations and if found in such combinations it breaks away as quickly as ever it can. Birds have wings—they fly. Animals have feet—they run. Man has the capacity of time-binding—he binds time. It does not matter whether we understand the very “essence” of the phenomenon or not, any more than we understand the “essence” of electricity or any other “essence.” Life shows that man has time-binding capacity as a natural gift and is naturally impelled to use it. One of the best examples is procreation. Conception is a completely incomprehensible phenomenon in its “essence,” nevertheless, having the capacity to procreate we use it without bothering about its “essence.” Indeed neither life nor science bothers about “essences”—they leave “essences” to metaphysics, which is neither life nor science. It is sufficient for our purpose that idealization is in fact a natural process of time-binding human energy. And however imperfect ethics has been owing to the prevalence of animal standards, such merits as our ethics has had witness to the natural presence of “idealization” in time-binding human life. “It is thus evident that ideals are not things to gush over or to sigh and sentimentalize about; they are not what would be left if that which is hard in reality were taken away; ideals are themselves the very flint of reality, beautiful no doubt and precious, without which there would be neither dignity nor hope nor light; but their aspect is not sentimental and soft; it is hard, cold, intellectual, logical, austere. Idealization consists in the conception or the intuition of ideals and in the pursuit of them. And ideals, I have said, are of two kinds. Let us make the distinction clearer. Every sort of human activity—shoeing horses, abdominal surgery, or painting profiles—admits of a peculiar type of excellence. No sort of activity can escape from its own type but within its type it admits of indefinite improvement. For each type there is an ideal—a dream of perfection—an unattainable limit of an endless sequence of potential ameliorations within the type and on its level. The dreams of such unattainable perfections are as countless as the types of excellence to which they respectively belong and they together constitute the familiar world of our human ideals. To share in it—to feel the lure of perfection in one or more types of excellence, however lowly—is to be human; not to feel it is to be sub-human. But this common kind of idealization, though it is very important and very precious, does not produce