The problem for communist headquarters was how best to attack. The obvious target, as in most organizations, was the officers. To control one officer, such as a president, secretary, or treasurer, is often worth ten, twenty, or fifty rank-and-file members. Everything must be done to prepare for the next elections in an effort to oust as many anticommunists as possible and replace them with pro-Party people or at least neutrals. All officers of The 123 Group were bitterly anticommunist except one, the secretary. He would have loudly protested if called a Party member, and he wasn’t; but for many years he had maintained cordial contacts with Party officials. He was, in every respect, a sympathizer. He was popular and had a large personal following among the rank and file. For this reason the anticommunists had not been able to defeat him. Here was the obvious weak point. “We’ve got to draw up an entire slate of candidates,” the Party organizer emphasized. “Let’s call it the ‘Reform Ticket.’ We must include a few reactionaries. That’ll hide our interest.” Then the frank admission: “We must not show our hand. We’ll run on a program acceptable to the right wing as much as possible. After we get in we’ll take control.” The communist Trojan horse was jockeying for position. Maneuver often compensates for lack of numbers and organizational position. Deals, stratagems, and hypocrisy must be given free play. The secretary-sympathizer agreed to run on the Reform Ticket. His name would lend prestige and give the ticket a capable career officer. Here was the first breakthrough. More deals, however, were necessary. The chief problem now was the presidency. Whom to run? A known procommunist could not win. To support another anticommunist was unthinkable. The answer: an opportunist. The right man was at hand, a noncommunist, personally ambitious, who disliked the current president. Lacking a dynamic personality, a “little backward,” as one Party official called him, he could be “guided.” He was just the man to head the ticket. He was contacted. Run for president and you’ll receive “our” support. The communists, of course, didn’t openly identify themselves. The opportunist, however, probably suspected, but he didn’t care. That is the mark of an opportunist: his personal ambition is so great that it overrides every other consideration. Now the other noncommunist candidates on the Reform Ticket must be chosen. To communists there are different degrees of “foes.” A “60 per cent” foe is better “working material” than a “100 per cent” foe. Another may be appraised as a 40 or even 10 percenter. In drawing up the slate, find as many “low percenters” as possible. Also there is the practical factor, always to be remembered, of selecting candidates who can “pull” votes to the ticket. These deals were made. Then there was the task, after selection of the slate (which contained concealed communists along with noncommunists), of getting it elected.