This demand, of course, has precipitated a very nice problem in definition. What is a reasonable combination? What is an unreasonable one? What is a good trust? What is a bad one? Upon this all-important question the many weary hearings extending through four months before the Judiciary Committee last winter shed practically no light. The Civic Federation bill was based upon this fundamental distinction; and a large number of distinguished citizens appeared in favor of it. Congressman Littlefield, as each speaker appeared before the Committee, asked him to give a concrete illustration of a combination, forbidden by the Sherman Act, which really promoted the public interest and was therefore "reasonable." Mr. Seth Low frankly admitted that he could name no concrete case of the kind. He caused some amusement, however, when he read a letter from Andrew Carnegie touching upon this very subject. "One point seems to me essential," wrote Mr. Carnegie, "without it, little general progress can be made; namely, when new combinations are proposed, the first question must always be 'what is the object sought?' _In ninety-nine cases out of a hundred, it will undoubtedly be to rob the community of its right to the benefits of free competition, disguise it as one may_; therefore the Commissioner's duty is to obtain satisfactory proof that the application is to cover an exceptional case. The conditions must be peculiar, as those of common carriers and steel-rail agreements are." Mr. Carnegie's statement that ninety-nine per cent of trade agreements are made for the purpose of "robbing the community" and his implication that the exceptional one per cent are the agreements involving the manufacturers of steel rails, naturally provoked much hilarity.