In the case of those who had yielded themselves up of their own accord, the voluntary act constituted the confession, which it was the inquisitor’s object to obtain. For those accused who refused to confess there followed the interrogatory. Here the inquisitor acted as prosecutor and cross-examiner, as a sort of _juge d’instruction_.[381] Only the inquisitor’s office, unlike that of the _juge d’instruction_, did not end with the completion of the interrogatory; having conducted the examination, he would also afterwards pronounce the sentence. The interrogatory resolved itself into an unequal contest between inquisitor and accused. It was unequal, in the first place, because there was always a presumption against anyone charged with heresy. As we have seen, it was an offence for anyone to be so criminally negligent in vitally important matters as to allow his conduct to give rise to the slightest rumour of heresy. It was an excellent characteristic of both Roman and Canon law that the accused was held to be innocent until actually proved to be guilty. This characteristic was not shewn, in actual practice, in dealing with one accused of heresy. The mere fact of defamation tainted a man. It was, therefore, a matter of very great difficulty for the defendant to demonstrate his innocence. He had to demonstrate it; for the mere fact of the _diffamatio_, whether well-grounded or not, was good evidence against him; and to free himself, he must rebut this evidence. The process was indeed so difficult that it was much safer to confess guilt at the outset than to labour to prove innocence.