In Missouri, the calling of a physician by the patient as a witness to testify as to information acquired while attending, is a waiver.[323] But offering one physician as a witness is not a waiver of the privilege with reference to another.[324] An applicant for insurance may, by an express waiver in his application, make an efficient waiver, binding upon any one claiming under the contract of insurance.[325] In Nevada a waiver has been implied from the testimony of the patient and her mother, where the patient was an infant seven years of age.[326] And it was said that the parents of such an infant may make the waiver. In New York it has been held that reference to a family physician when answering questions on an application for insurance, is not a waiver;[327] nor is the presence of a third person, in aid of the patient;[328] nor is the bringing of an action for damages for an injury;[329] nor is the examination of the physician in a former trial by the opposing party;[330] but where the ban of secrecy is once removed in an action and the information once lawfully made public, at the instance of the patient, it cannot be restored, and the disclosure may then be compelled in any subsequent action;[331] it would seem, too, that a physician who becomes a witness to his patient’s last will and testament at the patient’s request is then subject to a thorough examination on all points involving the patient’s testamentary capacity.[332] Where the patient testified herself and called an attending physician to prove her physical condition, this was not a consent to the examination of another attending physician, and it was said that the opposite party by tactics on cross-examination could not compel the patient to abandon a privilege which she refused to waive.[333] Fish, J., in delivering the opinion of the Court in the last-mentioned case, said of the operation of the statute, that it allows the patient to use the testimony of the attending physician if he thinks his evidence will benefit his case, and to object and exclude it in case he thinks it will not benefit him; he may call to his aid the testimony of any one whose views he approves and exclude that of another whose testimony might tend to controvert that given with the consent of the patient; that in this case the excluded witness was the best witness and could tell nothing else than the patient had disclosed if she had told the truth and it would relate solely to what she and the other physician had described, but that the Court could not consider whether the statute tended to promote the cause of justice, and he distinguished _McKinney v. Grand Street Railroad Company_,[334] on the ground that there the consent had been that the same physician should disclose what he knew, while here the waiver of the excluded physician’s testimony had been constantly withheld.