In Missouri the statute protects information received _from the patient_; but this is not confined to oral communications, and includes knowledge gained by inspection of the patient’s person.[347] In _Lunz v. Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Company_ protection was said not to extend to information of this sort apparent on casual inspection, which any one might make, nor to symptoms which are obvious before the patient submits himself to any examination, such as an inflamed face, a bloodshot eye, alcoholic fumes, or delirium; nor to facts so superficial that in regard to them no confidence could have been reposed. But this distinction between hidden and patent facts is disapproved in _Kling v. City of Kansas_,[348] and the statement is made that the law does not rest on the confidence imposed. Knowledge or communications concerning the cause of a patient’s condition and the extent of his injuries have also been held to be included in the term information, because the disclosure of these matters involved the indirect disclosure of the condition;[349] but it was said that the physician may testify as to knowledge acquired independent of communications from the patient and of examination or inspection made by the witness for the purpose of treatment.[350] As divulging privileged information, a physician has not been allowed to answer what his patient’s hurts were, why he left a hospital, or whether he required longer treatment;[351] and it has also been held that a physician cannot give his opinion as to the mental condition of his patient based upon privileged knowledge.[352] In New York _information_ comprehends all knowledge acquired by the physician by communication, observation, or inspection;[353] it has been said to extend to all facts which necessarily come to the knowledge of the physician in a given professional case;[354] and it includes as well the opinion of the physician based upon his knowledge as the knowledge itself.[355] The physician cannot disclose the nature of his patient’s disease, whether he learned it by observation or examination or from what his patient told him;[356] nor can he testify as to what he told his patient.[357] In _Edington v. Ætna Life insurance Company_[358] it was said by Judge Earl that the statute was aimed at confidential communications and secret ailments, and that it did not extend to matters superficially apparent, such as a fever, a fractured leg or skull, or raving mania apparent to all;[359] but this view was disapproved expressly in the later case of _Renihan v. Dennin_.[360]