In New York, in an early case,[426] where a man consulted a physician with reference to committing an abortion and told him that a certain woman was pregnant by him, this admission was said not to be essential to enable him to prescribe, even if the relation of physician and patient were considered established; but this seems to be at variance with the later case of _People v. Brower_,[427] where the accused consulted a physician with reference to the treatment of a woman on whom he had attempted to commit an abortion, and admitted that he had done so, and the physician was not permitted to disclose it. A broader view is now taken of the word _necessary_. It has been held by the Court of Appeals that a physician could not testify that his patient had a venereal disease while under his care as a physician, the presumption being that he learned it for the purpose of prescribing;[428] and again, that it is assumed from the relationship that the information would not have been imparted except for the purpose of aiding the physician to prescribe.[429] But this presumption does not attach to information regarding a patient, communicated by a third person.[430] Where a person went to a physician to call for medicine, and it appeared that he was not consulting for himself and was not representing any one else who needed or desired medical assistance, the physician was allowed to testify as to a conversation which took place at that time.[431] In the case of _Edington v. Ætna Life Insurance Company_,[432] it was said that before the exclusion, the facts on which it is justified must appear in some way, and the Court must know somewhat of the circumstances; from the opinion it is easy to infer that it is only confidential communications and information as to secret ailments which may be regarded as necessary within the statute; but this view was overruled in _Grattan v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Company_,[433] and there it was distinctly stated that it is enough that the witness acquired the information in his character as physician and in the due and proper exercise of his calling, and that it is not incumbent on the person objecting, to show by formal proof that the information was necessary to enable the witness to prescribe. In this case the examination of the witness was as to the cause of his patient’s death, and the argument urged upon the attention of the Court was that information regarding the cause of death could not be necessary to enable the physician to prescribe, as the utility of the prescription ceased with the death and before the cause was determined; but the Court held that the privilege attached, because, although the death was the result of the cause, the facts constituting the cause were learned while the physician was attending the living patient in a professional capacity and from the symptoms manifested at that time.