“It is not because a man has a reputation for sagacity and judgment and power of reasoning that his opinion is admissible in testifying as a witness. If so, such men might be called in all cases to advise the jury, and it would change the mode of trial; but it is because a man’s professional pursuit, or his peculiar skill and knowledge of some department of science not common to men in general, enable him to draw inferences where men of common experience, after all the facts have been proved, would be left in doubt.” To the same effect see Muldowney _v._ Illinois Central R. R. Co., 36 Iowa, 472; Wharton on Evidence, Sec. 436; Greenleaf on Evidence, Sec. 441. _Qualifications of this General Rule._—The extent to which an expert witness can go in giving his opinion is limited to matters of science and skill, and does not extend to the expression of views on matters of legal or moral observation, or the manner in which others would probably be influenced if the parties had acted in one way rather than in another. Campbell _v._ Richards, 5 B. & Ad., 345. So it has been held that the question whether a physician has honorably and faithfully discharged his duty in a given case, either to his medical profession or to his patient, is not a question of science but of pure ethics, upon which the jury is as competent to decide as any one else, and in such a case an opinion would not be allowed to be given either by another medical practitioner or by a professor in the science of morals. Rogers on Expert Testimony, Sec. 11, citing Ramadge _v._ Ryan, 9 Bing., 333. There are also some matters of fact which apparently transcend the dividing line between common experience and judgment and scientific experience and judgment, as to which expert testimony is not receivable, but the jury and court must weigh the facts and draw the inferences for themselves. An interesting example of this is found in the case of Manke _v._ The People, 78 N. Y., 611 (17 Hun, 410), cited in Stephens’ “Digest of the Law of Evidence,” p. 107, note H, decided in the New York Court of Appeals a few years ago. In that case one Adolf was killed by a gunshot, and pieces of paper were found near the scene of the homicide bearing certain marks. An expert was called upon to say whether they were powder-marks, and whether the condition of the paper was such that in his opinion it was wadding which had been fired from a gun. This evidence was held to be inadmissible by the General Term of the Supreme Court, and this decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. These courts held that the question as to whether this was a wad fired from a gun was a matter which the jury was as competent to judge of as the witness. In delivering the opinion at General Term, Presiding Justice Talcott said that this case was very close to the border line, but in his judgment it was beyond the province of experts and within the province of jurors.