hands; for “if a man does such an act, of which the probable consequence may be, and eventually is, death, such killing may be murder, although no stroke is struck;” _4 Bl. Com._ 197. What then if a man for profit administer dangerous preparations of mercury to persons necessarily exposed to change of temperature, and inclemency of weather; nay, delusively hold out to them, that no mercury is employed, by which they are induced to neglect the most ordinary precautions; if death ensue is not this equally murder, _in foro conscientiæ_, as killing with the sword? Malice may be implied in law, as well as apparent; it may be general, as well as particular; and whenever a man has evinced, whether from avarice, cruelty, or wantonness, such disregard for the lives and safeties of mankind, as warrants the imputation of general malice, it is not necessary that individual malice be proved towards the party who has become his victim.[509] _1 Easts. P. C._ 231. “So too if a man hath a beast that is used to do mischief, and he knowing it, suffers it to go abroad, and it kills a man, even this is manslaughter in the owner: but if he had purposely _turned it loose_, though barely to frighten people, and make what is called sport, it is with us (as in the Jewish law) as much murder as if he had incited a bear or dog to worry them;” _4 Bl. Com._ 197. And _Hale_ says, _1 P. C._ 431, I have heard that the owner was hanged for it. Is there much difference, whether the mischief be done by a dangerous beast, or a poisonous drug? to us it appears that the man who vends or administers the one, is as guilty as he who is convicted of turning out the other. If _A_ give purging comfits to _B_ to make sport and not to hurt him, and _B_ dies thereof, it is a killing by _A_, but not murder, but manslaughter; 1, _II. P. C._ 431; _Dalt._ _cap._ 93. Here _A_ is not supposed cognisant of the dangerous nature of the comfits.