When the plea of pregnancy is made to stay execution “the judge must direct a jury of twelve matrons or discreet women to inquire the fact: and if they bring in their verdict _quick with child_ (for barely _with child_[100] unless it be alive in the womb, is not sufficient) execution shall be stayed generally till the next session: and so from session to session till either she is delivered, or proves by the course of nature not to have been with child at all. But if she once hath the benefit of this reprieve, and has been delivered, and afterwards become pregnant again, she shall not be entitled to the benefit of a further respite from that cause.[101] For she may now be executed before the child is _quick_ in the womb; and shall not, by her own incontinence, evade the sentence of justice.” _4 Bl. Com._ 395; (see also _2 Hawk. P. C._ 658, and authorities there.) But _Sir M. Hale_ says that though she be _quick_ a second time she shall have no respite on that account. _1 P. C._ 369. And yet he afterwards draws a nice distinction _in favorem prolis_, that if the woman were not quick, or with child at all,[102] at the time of the first inquest of the matrons, and afterwards become with child, she shall have her respite; “for the advantage she had at first was not really by reason of pregnancy, but by a mistake of the jury of women.” “And therefore as hath been said, in all cases of reprieves for pregnancy, the judge ought to make a new demand, what the prisoner hath to say wherefore execution should not be awarded.” _Ib._ And so in all cases where any time intervenes between the attainder and the award of execution, for the party may have become insane, or may plead pregnancy, or a pardon, or an act of grace, or diversity of person, that he is not the same that was attainted. _1 Bl. Com._ 396.