You cannot be unapprized of the powerful armies of our enemy, at this time in this and the southern States, and that their future plan is to push their successes in the same quarter, by still larger reinforcements. The forces to be opposed to these must be proportionably great, and these forces must be fed. By whom are they to be fed? Georgia and South Carolina are annihilated, at least, as to us. By the requisition to us to send provisions into Maryland, it is to be supposed that none are to come to the southern army, from any State north of this; for it would seem inconsistent, that while we should be sending north, Maryland, and other states beyond that, should be sending their provisions south. Upon North Carolina, then, already exhausted by the ravages of two armies, and on this State, are to depend for subsistence those bodies of men, who are to oppose the greater part of the enemy’s force in the United States, the subsistence of the German, and of half the British Conventioners. To take a view of this matter on the Continental requisitions of November the 4th, 1780, for specific quotas of provisions, it is observable that North Carolina and Virginia are to furnish 10,475,740 pounds of animal food, and 13,529 barrels of flour, while the States north of these will yield 25,293,810 pounds of animal food, and 106,471 barrels of flour. If the greater part of the British armies be employed in the South, it is to be supposed that the greater part of the American force will be sent there to oppose them. But should this be the case, while the distribution of the provisions is so very unequal, would it be proper to render it still more so, by withdrawing a part of our contributions to the support of posts northward of us? It would certainly be a great convenience to us, to deliver a portion of our specifics at Fredericktown, rather than in Carolina: but I leave it to you to judge, whether this would be consistent with the general good or safety. Instead of sending aids of any kind to the northward, it seems but too certain that unless very timely and substantial assistance be received from thence, our enemies are yet far short of the ultimate term of their successes. I beg leave, therefore, to refer to you, whether the specifics of Maryland, as far as shall be necessary, had not better be applied to the support of the posts within it, for which its quota is much more than sufficient, or, were it otherwise, whether those of the States north of Maryland had not better be called on, than to detract any thing from the resources of the southern opposition, already much too small for the encounter to which it is left. I am far from wishing to count or measure our contributions by the requisitions of Congress. Were they ever so much beyond these. I should readily strain them in aid of any one of our sister States. But while they are so short of those calls to which they must be pointed in the first instance, it would