Memoir, Correspondence, and Miscellanies, From the Papers of Thomas Jefferson, Volume 4Jefferson, Thomas
History
Memoir, Correspondence, and Miscellanies, From the Papers of Thomas Jefferson, Volume 4
Jefferson, Thomas
United States -- Politics and government -- 1775-1783; United States -- Politics and government -- 1783-1865
You ask my opinion on the question, whether the States can add any
qualifications to those which the constitution has prescribed for their
members of Congress? It is a question I had never before reflected on;
yet had taken up an off-hand opinion, agreeing with your first,
that they could not: that to add new qualifications to those of the
constitution, would be as much an alteration, as to detract from them.
And so I think the House of Representatives of Congress decided in some
case; I believe that of a member from Baltimore. But your letter having
induced me to look into the constitution, and to consider the question
a little, I am again in your predicament, of doubting the correctness of
my first opinion. Had the constitution been silent, nobody can doubt but
that the right to prescribe all the qualifications and disqualifications
of those they would send to represent them, would have belonged to the
State. So also the constitution might have prescribed the whole, and
excluded all others. It seems to have preferred the middle way. It has
exercised the power in part, by declaring some disqualifications, to
wit, those of not being twenty-five years of age, of not having been a
citizen seven years, and of not being an inhabitant of the State at the
time of election. But it does not declare, itself, that the member shall
not be a lunatic, a pauper, a convict of treason, of murder, of felony,
or other infamous crime, or a non-resident of his district; nor does
it prohibit to the State the power of declaring these, or any other
disqualifications which its particular circumstances may call for: and
these may be different in different States. Of course, then, by the
tenth amendment, the power is reserved to the State. If, wherever the
constitution assumes a single power out of many which belong to the same
subject, we should consider it as assuming the whole, it would vest
the General Government with a mass of powers never contemplated. On the
contrary, the assumption of particular powers seems an exclusion of all
not assumed. This reasoning appears to me to be sound; but, on so recent
a change of view, caution requires us not to be too confident, and that
we admit this to be one of the doubtful questions on which honest men
may differ with the purest motives; and the more readily, as we find we
have differed from ourselves on it.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Elsewhere in the archive
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account