Memoir, Correspondence, and Miscellanies, From the Papers of Thomas Jefferson, Volume 4Jefferson, Thomas
History
Memoir, Correspondence, and Miscellanies, From the Papers of Thomas Jefferson, Volume 4
Jefferson, Thomas
United States -- Politics and government -- 1775-1783; United States -- Politics and government -- 1783-1865
This series of successes has been tarnished only by the conflagrations
at Washington, a _coup de main_ differing from that at Richmond, which
you remember, in the revolutionary war, in the circumstance only, that
we had, in that case, but forty-eight hour’s notice that an enemy had
arrived within our capes; whereas at Washington there was abundant
previous notice. The force designated by the President was the double of
what was necessary; but failed, as is the general opinion, through
the insubordination of Armstrong, who would never believe the attack
intended until it was actually made, and the sluggishness of Winder
before the occasion, and his indecision during it. Still, in the end,
the transaction has helped rather than hurt us, by arousing the general
indignation of our country, and by marking to the world of Europe the
Vandalism and brutal character of the English government. It has merely
served to immortalize their infamy. And add further, that through the
whole period of the war, we have beaten them single-handed at sea, and
so thoroughly established our superiority over them with equal force,
that they retire from that kind of contest, and never suffer their
frigates to cruise singly. The Endymion would never have engaged the
frigate President, but knowing herself backed by three frigates and
a razee, who, though somewhat slower sailors, would get up before she
could be taken. The disclosure to the world of the fatal secret that
they can be beaten at sea with an equal force, the evidence furnished by
the military operations of the last year that experience is rearing us
officers, who, when our means shall be fully under way, will plant our
standard on the walls of Quebec and Halifax, their recent and signal
disaster at New Orleans, and the evaporation of their hopes from the
Hartford Convention, will probably raise a clamor in the British nation,
which will force their ministry into peace. I say force them; because,
willingly, they would never be at peace. The British ministers find in
a state of war rather than of peace, by riding the various contractors,
and receiving douceurs on the vast expenditures of the war supplies,
that they recruit their broken fortunes, or make new ones, and therefore
will not make peace, as long as by any delusions they can keep the
temper of the nation up to the war point. They found some hopes on
the state of our finances. It is true, that the excess of our banking
institutions, and their present discredit, have shut us out from the
best source of credit we could ever command with certainty. But the
foundations of credit still remain to us, and need but skill, which
experience will soon produce, to marshal them into an order which may
carry us through any length of war. But they have hoped more in their
Hartford Convention. Their fears of republican France being now done
away, they are directed to republican America, and they are playing the
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