This state of things embarrassed the negotiation with the Spanish minister, who was afraid, under these circumstances, to proceed without receiving instructions. Mr. Adams endeavored, however, to satisfy Onis, by assuring him that Pensacola had been taken without orders; but he also stated that no blame would be attached to Jackson, on account of the strong charges he brought against the Governor of Pensacola, who had threatened to drive him out of the province by force, if he did not withdraw. In support of these views, Mr. Adams adduced the opinions of writers on national law. To the members of the cabinet he admitted that it was requisite to carry the reasoning on his principles to the utmost extent they would bear, to come to this conclusion; yet he maintained that, if the question were dubious, it was better to err on the side of vigor than of weakness, of our own officer than of our enemy. There was a large portion of the public who coincided in opinion with Jackson, and if he were disavowed, his friends would assert that he had been sacrificed because he was an obnoxious man; that, after having had the benefit of his services, he was abandoned for the sake of conciliating the enemies of his country, and his case would be compared to that of Sir Walter Raleigh. Mr. Monroe listened with candor to the debates of the cabinet, without varying from his original opinion. They resulted in a disclaimer of power in the President to have authorized General Jackson to take possession of Pensacola. On this determination, Mr. Adams finally gave up his opposition, and acquiesced in the opinion of every other member of the cabinet, remarking on this result: "The administration are placed in a dilemma, from which it is impossible for them to escape censure by some, and factious crimination by many. If they avow and approve Jackson's conduct, they incur the double responsibility of having made a war against Spain, in violation of the constitution, without the authority of Congress. If they disavow him, they must give offence to his friends, encounter the shock of his popularity, and have the appearance of truckling to Spain. For all this I should be prepared; but the mischief of this determination lies deeper. 1. It is weakness, and confession of weakness. 2. The disclaimer of power in the executive is of dangerous example, and of evil consequences. 3. There is injustice to the officer in disavowing him, when in principle he is strictly justifiable. These charges will be urged with great vehemence on one side, while those who would have censured the other course will not support or defend the administration for taking this. I believe the other would have been a safer and a bolder course." A wish having been expressed that it should be stated publicly that the opinion of the members of the cabinet had been _unanimous_, Mr. Adams said that he had acquiesced in the ultimate determination, and would cheerfully bear his