Memoir of the Services of the Bengal Artillery: From the Formation of the Corps to the Present Time, with Some Account of Its Internal OrganizationBuckle, E. (Edmond)
History
Memoir of the Services of the Bengal Artillery: From the Formation of the Corps to the Present Time, with Some Account of Its Internal Organization
Buckle, E. (Edmond)
India -- History -- British occupation, 1765-1947; India -- History, Military; India. Army. Bengal Artillery
During this movement of the cavalry, the artillery halted, to be able,
if necessary, to support the former. But on the cavalry re-forming and
again forming column, the march was resumed, and orders[101] were
received by the senior officer, Brigadier Harriott, to escort the whole
of the field-artillery into Ferozepore for the purpose of refilling
their ammunition-boxes. But the action was now entirely over, and the
Sikh sirdar was making the best of his way towards the river.
In this action the artillery lost 31 killed, including officers; and 77
wounded (exclusive of lascars, &c.). Major D’Arcy Todd had his head
carried away by a cannon-shot on the 21st; Captain J. F. Egerton, at the
time attached to the quarter-master general’s department, was cut down
on the 22nd, near the village of Ferozepore, whilst carrying a message.
He lingered more than a month under very severe sabre-cuts, and died on
the 23rd of January, 1846. 1st Lieutenant P. C. Lambert, a very
promising young officer of horse-artillery, was killed by a cannon-shot
on the 22nd. The wounded officers were Captain W. K. Warner, commissary
of ordnance (slightly), Captain M. Mackenzie, brigade major (slightly),
1st Lieutenant R. M. Paton (slightly), and 1st Lieutenant E. Atlay
(slightly).
The artillery had several pieces disabled at different periods of the
action, and some six or seven limbers or waggons were blown up.
The exhaustion of the ammunition with the field-artillery at
Ferozeshuhur was a matter of too pregnant and suggestive a nature to be
lost, in the way of warning, upon the sagacious practical mind of the
Governor-General, who, soon after the conclusion of the war, addressed
himself to the remedy of the evil which had threatened such serious
consequences during the campaign. It was obvious that the guns had gone
into the field with a scanty supply of ammunition, and that the Indian
system, which allowed a smaller number of rounds than is sanctioned by
the regulations of the royal army, was unequal to the exigencies of such
trying service.[102] To remedy this for the future, it was recommended
by Lord Hardinge, that there should be allotted to each gun of every
troop and battery, whether a 6–pounder or a 9–pounder, two
ammunition-waggons, giving to each 6–pounder 224 rounds, and to each
9–pounder 168 rounds. One waggon, it was proposed should always be close
at hand with each gun in action, and the other in reserve, the whole
supply of ammunition being under the charge of the officer commanding
the troop or battery. The Military Board, whilst concurring in the
expediency of the proposed increase of ammunition, suggested that the
six waggons with the troop or battery, should be under the charge of the
officer commanding; and the six spare waggons in magazine, a proposal
which was readily concurred in by the Governor-General.
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