The highest praise has been bestowed by Sir Harry Smith on the artillery, for its conduct throughout these operations,—“The guns literally being,” he says, “constantly ahead of everything.” “I would beg,” he continues, in his despatch to the Commander-in-Chief, “to call his Excellency’s marked attention to Major Lawrenson, commanding the artillery; in Lieutenant-Colonel Alexander, Captain Turton, and Lieutenant-Colonel Lane, the service has officers of the very first order; and I am equally satisfied with Captain Boileau, in command of the 9–pounder battery, and with Lieutenant Mill, in charge of four light guns. The two 8–inch howitzers did right good service, organized, equipped, and brought into the field by the exertions and determination to overcome all difficulties of Lieutenant-Colonel Lane, equally well served and brought forward always with the infantry by Lieutenant Austen.” Lieutenant Tombs, who was present as acting aide-de-camp to the general, also received the thanks of Sir Harry Smith. In this engagement the artillery lost 3 men and 30 horses, _killed_; 15 men and 9 horses, _wounded_; 5 men and 12 horses, _missing_. We come now to the crowning action of Sobraon. It was on the night of the 7th of February that the long-expected siege-train arrived from Delhi, with four companies of foot-artillery, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Wood. The Commander-in-Chief, overjoyed by this accession to his strength, determined upon the immediate attack of the enemy’s intrenched position. But short time was allowed to the artillery to prepare ammunition for the heavy ordnance. On the 8th, the artillery, which had been detached with Sir Harry Smith, rejoined head-quarters: on the 9th, the plan of operations was sketched out for the following day. A little before midnight the heavy ordnance moved out of camp to the advanced position of Rodawallah, there to be joined by Brigadier Ashburnham’s brigade of infantry, to which was added the 62nd foot, which, owing to some mistake, did not reach that post till near gun-fire. The following account of the Sikh intrenchments and of the plan of attack is taken from the _Calcutta Review_:— “The Sikhs had taken up one of the falsest positions possible; viz. with their rear resting on the Sutlej; yet, by dint of much labour, some foreign science, and the ingenuity natural to a military people, they contrived to convert it into one of the strongest fortifications against which troops were ever led;—being nothing less than a series of vast semicircular intrenchments, the outer one of which was two miles and a half from end to end, and three quarters of a mile in depth; the whole surrounded by a deep ditch and ‘bristling’ with sixty-seven pieces of artillery. A bridge of boats united this formidable camp to another on the opposite bank of the Sutlej; where also were planted some heavy guns, whose range swept easily across the river.