3. To restrict the use of the formidable explosives now existing, and to prohibit the throwing of projectiles or explosives of any kind from balloons or by similar means. 4. To prohibit the use, in naval warfare, of submarine torpedo boats or plungers, or other similar engines of destruction, and to adopt an agreement not to construct, in the future, vessels with rams. 5. To apply to naval warfare the definitions of the Geneva Convention of 1864 as amended by the additional articles of 1868. 6. To neutralize, in accordance with the same convention, ships and boats engaged in saving those in danger of drowning during or after an engagement. 7. To revise the declaration concerning the laws and customs of war which was elaborated in 1874 by the Conference of Brussels but has remained unratified to the present time. 8. To accept in principle the employment of the “good offices” of mediation and optional arbitration in cases lending themselves thereto, with the object of preventing armed conflicts between nations; and to come to an understanding with respect to the mode of applying these good offices, and to establish a uniform practice in using them. It is understood that all questions concerning the political relations of states and the order of things established by treaties, and, in general, all questions which do not directly fall within the programme adopted by the cabinets, are to be absolutely excluded from the deliberations of the conference. When the text of the second circular is compared with the first, it can be seen how much water had been poured into the fiery wine that was first offered to the world. In the first document there is no trace of points 3–7. Only in points 1 and 8 are the fundamental thoughts preserved. The other six points were evidently inserted as a result of the replies, recommendations, and opinions that Count Muravieff had gathered in his journey through Europe, and perhaps also from personal letters emanating from the various courts. In the press, also, numerous utterances had declared that the only reasonable and positive result which could be attained by the Conference was to be found in modifying the regulations of war and in the domain of the Red Cross. Here even those who were not opponents of war and militarism would be able and willing to coöperate. Out of diplomatic consideration for such persons the six points in question were inserted. The famous military surgeon Professor Esmarch, a brother-in-law of the German Empress, worked especially hard for the Red Cross at the Conference. By this introduction of questions concerning military customs and the humanizing of war into the deliberations of the Peace Conference, a wedge (surely not without purpose) was driven into it calculated to rob it of its individual character. That was distinctly shown in the Second Hague Conference, in 1907.