"On what principle could a part of the general laws of the Territory go to that island, and a part not? It is of the very essence of general laws, at least, that they should be uniform and universal. If the territorial jurisdiction extended at all, it is complete and entire. It reaches all rightful subjects of legislation, and is supreme within those limits. "For the above reasons, I am of the opinion that Watts was rightfully indicted under section 4 of the Crime Act of 1790, which reads as follows: 'If a person or persons, within any fort, arsenal, dockyard, magazine, or in any other place, or district or country, under the sole and exclusive jurisdiction of the United States, commit the crime of wilful murder, such person or persons, on being thereof convicted, shall suffer death.' "But if there is a doubt as to whether San Juan Island was within the Third Judicial District or not, then the last clause of section 28 of the Crime Act of 1790 would apply, for Watts was first brought into the Third Judicial District and delivered to the marshal of the Territory by the order of the Secretary of War." Immediately after the reversal I called a special term of the Court at Port Townsend, at which Watts was re-indicted on the Territorial side of the Court, tried, and again convicted and sentenced to be hung. He again appealed to the Supreme Court, but the judgment was affirmed; he then sued out a writ of error to the Supreme Court of the United States, and it was allowed, and it came up for hearing while I was Delegate from the Territory. The Court was informed that Watts had escaped from jail and was at large, and the Supreme Court refused to hear his writ of error. He has never been recaptured. After all this had transpired, the German Emperor decided that the Canal de Haro was the true boundary line under the Treaty. The British troops were withdrawn from San Juan Island, and peace and friendship prevailed. While I have always been in favor of liberty regulated by law, and have believed that order and security were the sure resultants of law's vigorous enforcement, yet there may be times and conditions, in frontier communities, when the suspension of the general rule, like the suspension of the great writ of Habeas Corpus, may be justified in the forum of reason and morals. Especially, is this true when the furore of the populace is not based on race, or class prejudice, or the frenzy of religion, or party madness; but has only for its ultimate, the security of person, property and habitation.