It would lead us far beyond our limits to follow the blunders which on both sides signalised the campaign. Charles opened it by sending an army into Lombardy, under Sir Bernard Stuart of Aubigny, cousin-german of John first Earl of Lennox in Scotland, whose career in arms was rewarded with many dignities, and who, after uniting his troops with those of Ludovico il Moro, his now unwilling ally, advanced on Romagna. The King, leaving Vienne upon the 22nd of August, took the Cenis pass with the main body of his forces, and on the 9th of September was at Asti in Piedmont. From thence he visited Milan, before marching against Florence. To meet these formidable foes, Alfonso alone manifested any energy. He sent a fleet to the Ligurian coast to watch a naval armament which had been fitted out at Marseilles, and, if possible, to make a diversion upon Genoa. He at the same time dispatched his eldest son Ferdinand, Duke of Calabria, accompanied by two experienced generals, Nicolò Orsini Count of Petigliano and Gian Giacomo Trivulzio, to support the Bolognese against the onset of d'Aubigny. Being joined at Cesena by Guidobaldo of Urbino, who had been engaged by Alfonso with 200 men-at-arms, at an annual pay of 24,000 ducats, and by Giovanni Sforza, the Duke found himself at the head of 2500 men-at-arms and 8000 foot, of whom the portion belonging to Florence was commanded by Annibale Bentivoglio. But none of these leaders possessed a master influence suited to the crisis. The spirit of cordiality and mutual confidence, which alone could promise success, was on this as on all similar occasions wanting to Italy; and whilst Trivulzio and the other commanders, confident in the superiority of their army, urged on a decisive engagement, Petigliano exposed himself to the charge of sluggishness or the suspicion of bad faith, by frustrating all their endeavours.