The arrangement of our troops was inimitable; _years_ could not have improved it. Our right had been fairly turned since the 20th; the army were presenting a new front, so that the _first_ or _last_, whichever it may be termed, of military movements was to be effected, that is for the contending armies to _change places_. The French could not attack our left that day; if they had, the right of their army must have been either surrounded or cut to pieces. The third division would have hung on their flank, the light division would have engaged them in front, the masses behind the Table Mountain could have debouched on either side, while our cavalry, artillery, and the rest of the army, could have moved forward, and attacked the left of the French in the plain, which must have advanced to support such a movement. The Table Mountain is the mark of the French marshal's discomfiture. Military men say the French ought to have taken possession of it: but was their army up and strong enough to maintain it? The advance of the enemy at six o'clock in the morning was not that of their whole force: I should say, that it was merely a _reconnaissance_; half a dozen squadrons of cavalry and a division of infantry must not be taken for a whole army. Nor had the French soldiers wings; for in justice to them, more could not have been done by legs. The Duke of Ragusa might have had his army in hand, and could have placed a corps of observation where his centre stood; then towards evening manœuvred with his main body at a greater distance from our right flank, and threatened to cut us off from Rodrigo, (and thereby change positions with us) until nightfall; at the same time keeping his communications open with Alba de Tormes, in the event of his not deeming it advisable to follow up such a movement the next day. At all events, the French general would have gained time, which was precious to him, as reinforcements were on the road to join him. The fact was, the French marshal was completely out-generalled: the Table Mountain puzzled him; and the third division descending from Cabrerizos at twelve o'clock, and raising clouds of dust as they passed along the rear of our army[37], caused the Duke of Ragusa to imagine that we were drawing off, which I am confident led him to take hasty measures, forgetting that he had been manœuvring only on _blank_ ground the four previous days. The Earl of Wellington saw his over haste and his error; knowing that to support such an extension of the left, the enemy ought to have advanced in force on the village of the Arapiles, or that they must expose their left to a flank attack, which they did. On the other hand, had they advanced towards the Arapiles in the plain in force, our right and centre would have become engaged, and the troops concealed behind the Table Mountain could have debouched, and hovered on their right flank.