Memoirs of the Late War, Vol 2 (of 2): Comprising the Personal Narrative of Captain Cooke, of the 43rd Regiment Light Infantry; the History of the Campaign of 1809 in Portugal, by the Earl of Munster; and a Narrative of the Campaign of 1814 in Holland, by Lieut. T. W. D. Moodie, H. P. 21st FusileersCooke, John Henry, Sir
History
Memoirs of the Late War, Vol 2 (of 2): Comprising the Personal Narrative of Captain Cooke, of the 43rd Regiment Light Infantry; the History of the Campaign of 1809 in Portugal, by the Earl of Munster; and a Narrative of the Campaign of 1814 in Holland, by Lieut. T. W. D. Moodie, H. P. 21st Fusileers
Cooke, John Henry, Sir
Europe -- History -- 1789-1815
Although it was understood that Sir Arthur's orders only extended
to the defence of Portugal, yet he felt that these stirring times
required active exertions from all Europe, and that tranquillity was
incompatible with the strides France was making to universal dominion.
The cause of our allies on the spot, and of those more distant,
struggling in Germany, pointed out the propriety of some attempt to
create at least a diversion in their favour. It was evident that, could
arrangements be made with the Spaniards, the disorganization of Soult's
army offered an opportunity for striking a blow at Victor, and perhaps
at the Spanish capital, particularly as Sebastiani was supposed to be
fully employed in La Mancha. Sir Arthur, in consequence, offered to aid
the Spaniards in a forward offensive movement into Spanish Estramadura.
Such a step appeared the only means of re-establishing the war in the
Peninsula, as the cause of Spain was fast sinking under the superior
troops and management of the French, who, however they might dread the
population, had learned that the armies were incapable of opposing
their progress[33]. Much precious time was wasted in the arrangements
for the necessary co-operation of the two armies, which, but for the
pride and obstinacy of Cuesta, might have been more usefully employed.
It was only after considerable _negotiation_, (an expression perfectly
applicable to the intercourse between ourselves and our allies, though
we had only in view the saving their country,) that it was determined
to make a simultaneous advance into Spanish Estramadura.
In the meanwhile, Victor, who had retreated from the Guadiana, and
withdrawn his army across the Tagus, was evidently falling back to
receive aid from Madrid and La Mancha. The plan for this forward
movement, was the advance of both armies along each bank of the Tagus,
and a junction of the allies in front of the enemy in the plains of
Estramadura. The British were to march to the north of the river by
Coria and Placentia, turning Almaraz and the enemy's posts facing
Cuesta, while the others were to cross at Almaraz, and to co-operate
with our advancing columns. It was necessary to secure the frontier of
Portugal to the north and north-east, and the passes along the frontier
of that country leading from Castille and Leon, as two _corps d'armée_,
besides that of Soult, were in the north of Spain.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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