_May 16th_.--Your letter is gloomy indeed, and should your forebodings be realised you may be sure that I should be as grieved as yourself. All my life, and now as much as ever, I have looked upon the alliance of France and England as infinitely desirable for both; and if I were so unfortunate as to cause a breach between the two countries, it would be very much against my will, and without my knowledge. Tunis cannot be a source of discord between us, and I hope that public opinion, over-excited at present, will return to a more calm and just appreciation of the case. We have declared to Europe that we wish for no annexations or conquests, and will attempt none; we have quite enough with the two million five hundred thousand Mussulmans in Algeria; it would be madness to add fifteen or sixteen hundred thousand more to them, and a hundred and fifty leagues to our frontier. For Algeria thus extended we should require an army of 100,000 men, who would be much missed in case of any complication in Europe. All that we want in Tunis is a power which will not be hostile to us, and continually threaten our African possessions. We shall only occupy Biserta and the other places as long as appears necessary; but we will not make a port of it; for that, as Sir Charles Dilke has said, would involve a cost of some 200 millions. I have just sent Lord Lyons a despatch upon that special subject, which will appear in the next Blue Book. Tunis will never belong to France; she does not want it; but should it belong to Italy, who already owns Sicily, the passage to Malta might be made difficult. I know that England has not much to fear from Italy; but circumstances may change; and the gratitude she shows towards us now proves how much she will have for other benefactors. I cannot understand how my despatch of May 9th can have been interpreted as the announcement of our taking possession. In form and intention it was quite the contrary. Our actions will show that we only speak the truth. Neither can I admit that even the conquest of Tunis can ever equal in importance the taking of Constantinople by the Russians, which in my eyes will be the greatest event of modern times, as the taking of it by the Turks in 1453 was an important event in the fifteenth century. As to the Treaty of Commerce, I am doing all in my power to facilitate the negotiations. I suppose that public opinion in England is at present principally occupied with this; and that, if it is satisfactorily arranged, Tunis will very soon be forgotten. A thousand more interests are engaged in the agreement on a specific tariff than could ever be involved in this unfortunate Regency. But I content myself with saying with the poet--_Di avertant omen_; and I desire that England may be as well disposed towards us as we are towards her.