Ottoman dominions, and that all the resources of diplomacy or of war ought to be exerted to prevent it. In the joint article before us, the condition of affairs in 1853 is thus stated in a few words:--'Russia had formed the design to extort from Turkey, in one form or another, a right of protection over the Christians. She never abandoned that design. She thought she could enforce it. The Western Powers interposed and the strife began.... England has no call to throw off the responsibility of the measures taken on any other Power. Those measures were taken because they were demanded by her own conception of the duty she had to perform; and by far the largest share of that responsibility rests with this country. We see no reason to deny it; and if the case occurred again, we should see no reason to act with less determination.' And again as to the prosecution of the war after the raising of the siege of Silistria--which, according to Kinglake, was unnecessary; or the invasion of the Crimea--which was unjustifiable, to be accounted for, not by any large views of politics or of war, but by paltry personal passions and influences of the most contemptible kind:--England and France declared by their despatches of July 22nd, that the sacrifices already imposed on them were too great, and the cause they had taken in hand too important, for them to desist, unless they obtained from Russia adequate securities against the renewal of hostilities. They therefore demanded:--l. That the protectorate claimed by Russia over the Principalities by virtue of former treaties now abrogated, should cease. 2. That the navigation of the mouths of the Danube should be free. 3. That the treaty of July 13th, 1841, should be revised in the sense of a restriction of the naval power of Russia in the Black Sea. 4. That no Power should claim an official protectorate over the Christian subjects of the Porte. On August 8th, Austria entirely adopted these principles, and on the 10th she urged Russia to accede to these demands. On the 26th Russia positively rejected these terms. Had they been accepted, it is needless to add that the Crimean expedition would not have taken place. Here, then, is the clear and precise ground on which the war assumed an offensive character against Russia--viz. to compel her to submit to terms of peace, which England and France held to be necessary to the future safety of Turkey, and which Austria had fully adopted. This is the political explanation of the war, and it was fully justified, as each preceding step of the allies had been justified, by a fresh refusal on the part of Russia to agree to the terms proposed by the allies. It is unnecessary to carry this examination further. It has been introduced here merely as an illustration and a proof of the historical importance of the article now that Lord Clarendon's share in it is understood, and we are made acquainted with the peculiar