In consequence of the absence of Marshal Bourmont on the Algerian expedition, Polignac was minister of war _ad interim_ [as well as minister of foreign affairs]; but he had not made the smallest military preparations, or even inquiries, as to the possibility of putting down a popular tumult. On that Sunday, for the first time, he sent for the officers in command of the troops. A dispute arose between them, which Polignac had to settle. It then turned out that in the whole of the first military division, which included not only Paris, but Orleans and Rouen and all the intermediate places, there were not 12,000 men. In Paris itself about 3,400 at that moment, including the _gendarmerie_. The reason of this was a political and military combination which the Government had formed, but which I never before heard mentioned by anyone. Polignac had for some time been intriguing to detach Belgium from the King of Holland's dominions--chiefly from a fanatical desire to release a Catholic population from their Protestant connexion, but in part, also, from a notion that a military demonstration on the side of Belgium would be popular in France, and would disarm the Opposition. So that the movement which took place at Brussels shortly after the Revolution of July, and was attributed to the example of that democratic explosion, had, in fact, been prepared by Polignac himself. This is strange enough; but what is still more strange is that the very means taken to promote this lawless object proved to be the ruin of Charles X. and his minister. With a view to the occupation of Belgium, or at least of a demonstration on the frontier, they had assembled two large camps at Luneville and St.-Omer; and in these camps the bulk of the available forces of the kingdom were collected, especially as Bourmont had with him a considerable and well-appointed army in Africa. So that at the very moment when troops were most needed in Paris, one portion of the King's army was beyond the seas, and another out of reach on the Belgian frontier.