Memorabilia Mathematica; or, the Philomath's Quotation-Book
Science
Memorabilia Mathematica; or, the Philomath's Quotation-Book
Mathematics; Mathematics -- Quotations, maxims, etc.
=1963.= The theory of probabilities is at bottom nothing but
common sense reduced to calculus; it enables us to appreciate
with exactness that which accurate minds feel with a sort of
instinct for which ofttimes they are unable to account. If we
consider the analytical methods to which this theory has given
birth, the truth of the principles on which it is based, the fine
and delicate logic which their employment in the solution of
problems requires, the public utilities whose establishment rests
upon it, the extension which it has received and which it may
still receive through its application to the most important
problems of natural philosophy and the moral sciences; if again
we observe that, even in matters which cannot be submitted to the
calculus, it gives us the surest suggestions for the guidance of
our judgments, and that it teaches us to avoid the illusions
which often mislead us, then we shall see that there is no
science more worthy of our contemplations nor a more useful one
for admission to our system of public education.--LAPLACE.
_Théorie Analytique des Probabilitiés,
Introduction; Oeuvres, t. 7 (Paris,
1886), p. 153._
=1964.= It is a truth very certain that, when it is not in our
power to determine what is true, we ought to follow what is most
probable.--DESCARTES.
_Discourse on Method, Part 3._
=1965.= As _demonstration_ is the showing the agreement or
disagreement of two ideas, by the intervention of one or more
proofs, which have a constant, immutable, and visible connexion
one with another; so _probability_ is nothing but the appearance
of such an agreement or disagreement, by the intervention of
proofs, whose connexion is not constant and immutable, or at
least is not perceived to be so, and it is enough to induce the
mind to judge the proposition to be true or false, rather than
contrary.--LOCKE, JOHN.
_An Essay concerning Human
Understanding, Bk. 4, chap. 15, sect.
1._
=1966.= The difference between necessary and contingent truths is
indeed the same as that between commensurable and incommensurable
numbers. For the reduction of commensurable numbers to a common
measure is analogous to the demonstration of necessary truths, or
their reduction to such as are identical. But as, in the case of
surd ratios, the reduction involves an infinite process, and yet
approaches a common measure, so that a definite but unending
series is obtained, so also contingent truths require an infinite
analysis, which God alone can accomplish.--LEIBNITZ.
_Philosophische Schriften [Gerhardt] Bd.
7 (Berlin, 1890), p. 200._
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