Meantime, it was objected that often the most obvious results from a virtuous action were far otherwise than beneficial. Upon which, Paley, in the long note referred to above, distinguished thus: That whereas actions have many results, some proximate, some remote, just as a stone thrown into the water produces many concentric circles, be it known that he, Dr. Paley, in what he says of utility, contemplates only the final result, the very outermost circle; inasmuch as he acknowledges a possibility that the first, second, third, including the penultimate circle, may all happen to clash with utility; but then, says he, the outermost circle of all will never fail to coincide with the absolute maximum of utility. Hence, in the first place, it appears that you cannot apply this test of utility in a practical sense; you cannot say, This is useful, _ergo_, it is virtuous; but, in the inverse order, you must say, This is virtuous, _ergo_, it is useful. You do not rely on its usefulness to satisfy yourself of its being virtuous; but, on the contrary, you rely on its virtuousness, previously ascertained, in order to satisfy yourself of its usefulness. And thus the whole practical value of this test disappears, though in that view it was first introduced; and a vicious circle arises in the argument; as you must have ascertained the virtuousness of an act, in order to apply the test of its being virtuous. But, _secondly_, it now comes out that Paley was answering a very different question from that which he supposed himself answering. Not any practical question as to the motive or impelling force in being virtuous, rather than vicious,--that is, to the _sanctions_ of virtue,--but a purely speculative question, as to the issue of virtue, or the common _vinculum_ amongst the several modes or species of virtue (justice, temperance, etc.)--this was the real question which he was answering. I have often remarked that the largest and most subtle source of error in philosophic speculations has been the confounding of the two great principles so much insisted on by the Leibnitzians, namely, the _ratio cognoscendi_ and the _ratio essendi_. Paley believed himself to be assigning--it was his full purpose to assign--the _ratio cognoscendi_; but, instead of that, unconsciously and surreptitiously, he has actually assigned the _ratio essendi_; and, after all, a false and imaginary _ratio essendi_. THE PAGAN ORACLES