Receptual judgment, then, has to do with recepts; pre-conceptual judgment with pre-concepts; and true judgments with true concepts. Or, conversely stated, receptual knowledge leads to receptual judgment (_e.g._ when a sea-bird dives into water but alights upon land): pre-conceptual knowledge leads to pre-conceptual judgment in the statement of such knowledge (_e.g._ when a child, by extending the name of a dog to the picture of a dog, virtually affirms, though it does not conceive, the resemblance which it perceives): and, lastly, conceptual knowledge leads to conceptual or veritable judgment, in the statement of such knowledge known as knowledge (_e.g._ when, in virtue of his powers of reflective thought, a man not only states a truth, but states that truth as true). * * * * * Thus far I doubt whether my opponents will find it easy to meet me. They may, of course, cavil at some or all of the above distinctions; but, if so, it is for them to show cause for complaint. They have raised objections to the theory of evolution on purely psychological grounds. I meet their objections upon these their own grounds, and therefore the only way in which they can answer me is by showing that there is something wrong in my psychological analysis. This I fearlessly invite them to do. For all the distinctions which I have made I have made out of consideration to the exigencies of their argument. Although these distinctions may appear somewhat bewilderingly numerous, I do not anticipate that any competent psychologist will complain of them on account of their having been over-finely drawn. For each of them marks off an important territory of ideation, and all the territories so marked off must be separately noted, if the alleged distinction of kind between one and another is to be seriously investigated. In his essays upon the theory of evolution, Mr. Mivart not unfrequently complains of the disregard of psychological analysis which is betokened by any expression of opinion to the effect, that as between one great territory of ideation and another there is only a difference of degree. But surely this complaint comes with an ill grace from a writer who bases an opposite opinion upon a precisely similar neglect—or upon a bare statement of the greatest and most obvious of all the distinctions in psychology, without so much as any attempt to analyze it. Therefore, if my own attempt to do this has erred on the side of overelaboration, it has done so only on account of my desire to do full justice to the opposite side. In the result, I claim to have shown that if it is possible to suggest a difference of kind between any of the levels of ideation which have now been defined, this can only be done at the last of them—or where the advent of self-consciousness enables a mind, not only to _know_, but to _know that it knows_; not only to _receive_ knowledge, but also to _conceive_