The first is that fully a third of the whole number might be dispensed with, and yet leave no important blank in the already limited resources of the list for the purposes either of communication or reflection. To yawn, to spew, to vomit, to sweat, and so on, are not forms of activity of any such vital importance to the needs of a primitive community, as to demand priority of naming by any aboriginal framers of language. Moreover, as Professor Max Müller himself elsewhere observes, “even these 121 concepts might be reduced to a much smaller number, if we cared to do so. Any one who examines them carefully, will see how easy it would have been to express to dig by to cut or to strike; to bite by to cut or to crush; to milk by to squeeze; to glean by to gather; to steal by to lift.... If we see how many special purposes can be served by one root, as _I_, to go, or _Pas_, to fasten, the idea that a dozen of roots might have been made to supply the whole wealth of our dictionary, appears in itself by no means so ridiculous as is often supposed.”[181] Again, in the second place, a large proportional number of the words have reference to a grade of culture already far in advance of that which has been attained by most existing savages. “Many concepts, such as to cook, to roast, to measure, to dress, to adorn, belong clearly to a later phase of civilized life.”[182] It might have been suitably added that such “concepts” as to dig, to plant, to milk, &c., betoken a condition of _pastoral_ life, which, as we know from abundant evidence, is representative of a comparatively high level of social evolution.[183] But if “many” of these concepts are thus unmistakably referable to semi-civilized as distinguished from savage life, what guarantee can we have that the remainder are “original”? Obviously we can have no such guarantee; but, on the contrary, find the very best, because _intrinsic_ evidence, that they belong to a more or less high level of culture, far removed from that of primitive man. In other words, we must conclude that these 121 concepts are “original” only in the sense that they do not now admit of further analysis at the hands of comparative philologists: they are not original in the sense of bringing us within any measurable distance of the first beginnings of articulate speech.[184]