Mental Philosophy: Including the Intellect, Sensibilities, and WillHaven, Joseph
Philosophy
Mental Philosophy: Including the Intellect, Sensibilities, and Will
Haven, Joseph
Psychology
_The Mind not wholly passive in the Process._--I reply this is not
altogether so. The mind is not altogether _passive_ in this thing;
there is an _activity_ involved in the process, and that of the mind's
own. There is a power, either original or acquired, of conceiving
such thoughts as are now under consideration, a readiness for them,
a proneness to them, a bias, propensity, inclination, more powerful
in some than in others, by virtue of which this process occurs.
We may call this a faculty, though, more strictly, perhaps, _a
susceptibility_, but it is, in truth, one of the endowments of the
mind, part of its furniture, one form of its activity.
_A more direct voluntary Element._--But there is, further than this,
and more directly, a voluntary element in the process. It is in our
power to yield, or not, to this propensity, this inclination to the
ideal; to put forth the mental activity in this direction, or to
withhold it; to say whether or not the imagination shall have its free,
full play, and with liberated wing soar aloft through her native skies;
whether our speech shall be simple argument, unadorned stout logic, or
logic not less stout, clothed with the pleasing, rustling drapery which
a lively imagination is able to throw, like a splendid robe, over the
naked form of truth.
There is, then, really a mental activity, and an activity in some
degree under control of the will, in the process we are considering.
_Same Difficulty lies elsewhere._--The same difficulty which meets us
here, meets us elsewhere, and lies equally against other mental powers.
We cannot, by direct volition, remember a past event, for this implies,
as in the case of the volition to imagine a given scene, either that
the thing is already in view, or else that we will we know not what.
Yet, as every one knows, there is a way of recalling past events; a
faculty or power of doing this thing; a faculty which we exercise when
we please.
The same may be said of the power of thought in general. We cannot,
by direct volition, _think_ of any given thing, for to will to think
of it is already to have thought of it, yet there is mental activity
involved in every process of thought a mental power exercised, a
faculty of some sort exercised. Nor is it a power altogether beyond
our own control. We can direct our thoughts, can govern them, can turn
them, as we do a water course, that _will_ flow somewhere, but whose
channel we may lead this way or that.
§ IX.--USE AND ABUSE OF IMAGINATION.
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