Mental Philosophy: Including the Intellect, Sensibilities, and WillHaven, Joseph
Philosophy
Mental Philosophy: Including the Intellect, Sensibilities, and Will
Haven, Joseph
Psychology
The poet is not content with this description. The swiftness and
silentness of those passing hours remind him of the flight of birds
along the sky. The resemblance strikes him as beautiful. He embodies it
in his description. It is an ideal conception. He goes further. He sees
in the water, not the reflection merely of the stars, but the stars
themselves, as many in the sea as in the sky. Here is a departure from
the truth, from the actual, an advance into the region of the ideal.
Imagination, thus set free, takes still further liberties: attributes
to the inanimate wave the _dimpled cheek_ of beauty, ascribes its
restlessness not to the laws of gravitation, but to the force of a
strictly human passion, under the influence of which it leaps into
the air toward the object of its affection, seizes it, and holds it,
trembling, in its embrace.
§ XI.--HISTORICAL SKETCH.
VARIOUS DEFINITIONS, AND THEORIES OF IMAGINATION BY DIFFERENT WRITERS.
_Definition of Dr. Reid._--_Reid_ makes it nearly synonymous with
simple apprehension. "I take imagination, in its most proper sense, to
signify a lively conception of _objects of sight_," the conception of
things as they appear to the eye. _Addison_ employs the term with the
same limitation, that is, as confined to objects of sight.
_Of Stewart._--_Stewart_ regards this as incorrect, holds that
imagination is not confined to _visible_ or even _sensible_ objects.
He regards it as a complex, not a simple power, including simple
apprehension, abstraction, judgment, or taste, and association of
ideas; its province being to select, from different objects, a variety
of qualities and circumstances, and combine and arrange them so as to
form a new creation of its own.
_Of Brown._--_Brown_ differs not essentially from the view of Stewart.
He also makes imagination a complex operation, involving conception,
abstraction, judgment, association. He distinguishes between the
_spontaneous_ and the _voluntary_ operation of the imaginative power;
in the former case, there is no voluntary effort of selection,
combination, etc., but images arise independently of any desire or
choice of ours, by the laws of suggestion; and this he holds to be
the most frequent operation of the faculty. In the case of voluntary
imagination, which is attended with desire, this desire is the
prominent thing, and serves to keep the conception of the subject
before the mind, in consequence of which, a variety of associated
conceptions follow, by the laws of suggestion, in regular train. Of
these suggested conceptions and images, some, we approve, others, we
do not; the former, by virtue of our approval, become more lively and
permanent, while the latter pass away. Thus, without any direct effort
or power of the will to combine and separate these various conceptions,
they shape themselves according to our approval and desire, in
obedience to the ordinary laws of suggestion.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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