_Argument of the Nominalist._--But the nominalist replies. The term man, or triangle, awakens in your mind, in reality and directly, only the idea of some particular individual or triangle, and this stands as a sort of _type_ or _representation_ of other like individuals of whom you do not definitely think as such and so many. I reply, this cannot be shown; but even if it were so, the very language of the objection implies the power of having general conceptions. If the individual man or triangle thought of stands as a type or representation, as it is said, of a great number of similar men and triangles, then is there not already in my mind, prior to this act of representation, the _idea of a class of objects_, arranged according to the law of resemblance, in other words, a _general abstract idea_ or _conception_? If I had not already formed such an idea, the particular object presented to my thoughts could not stand as type or representation of any such thing, or of any thing beyond itself, for the simple reason that there would be nothing of the sort to represent. _Further Reply._--Besides, there is a large class of general terms to which this reasoning of the nominalist would not at all apply--such terms as virtue, vice, knowledge, wisdom, truth, time, space--which manifestly do not awaken in the mind the thought of any particular virtue or vice, any particular truth, any definite time, any definite space, but a general notion under which all particular instances may be included. To this the nominalist will perhaps reply, that in such cases we are really thinking, after all, of mere _names_ or _signs_, as when we use the algebraic formula _x-y_, a mere term of convenience, having indeed some value, we do not know precisely what, _itself_ the terminus and object of our thought for the time being. In such cases the mind stops, he would say, with the term itself, and does not go beyond it to conjure up a general conception for it. So it is with the terms virtue, vice; so with the general terms, class, species, genus, man, animal, triangle; they are mere collective terms, _signs_, formulas of convenience, to which you attach no more meaning than to the expression _x-y_. If you would find their meaning and attach any definite idea to them, you must resolve them into the _particular_ objects, the particular vices, virtues, etc., which go to make up the class. I reply to all this, you are still classifying, still forming a general conception, the expression of which is your so called formula, _x-y_, alias virtue, man, and the like. § II.--PROVINCE AND RELATION OF SEVERAL TERMS EMPLOYED TO DENOTE, IN PART, OR AS A WHOLE, THIS POWER OF THE MIND. We are now prepared to consider the proper province and relation of several terms frequently employed, with considerable latitude and diversity of meaning, to denote, in part, or as a whole, the process now described. Such are the terms _abstraction_, _generalization_, _classification_, and _judgment_.