Mental Philosophy: Including the Intellect, Sensibilities, and WillHaven, Joseph
Philosophy
Mental Philosophy: Including the Intellect, Sensibilities, and Will
Haven, Joseph
Psychology
_Theory of Unity in Variety._--Evidently we must seek elsewhere than in
utility the dwelling-place of beauty. The secret of her tabernacle is
not there. Let us see, then, if _unity in variety_ may not be, as some
affirm, the principle of the beautiful. The intellect demands a general
unity, as, _e. g._, in a piece of music, a painting, or a play, and
is not satisfied unless it can perceive such unity. The parts must be
not only connected but related, and that relation must be obvious. At
the same time the sensibility demands variety, as _e. g._, of tone and
time in the music, of color and shade in the painting, of expression
in both. The same note of a musical instrument continuously produced,
or the same color unvaried in the painting, would be intolerable. The
due combination of these two principles, unity and variety, say these
writers, constitutes what we call beauty in an object. The waving line
of Hogarth may be taken as an illustration of this principle.
_Objection to this View._--Without entering fully into the discussion
of this theory, it may be sufficient to say, that while the principle
now named does enter, in some degree into our conception of the
beautiful, it can hardly be admitted as the ground and cause, or even
as the chief element of beauty. Not every thing is beautiful which
presents both unity and variety. Some things, on the other hand, are
beautiful which lack this combination. Some colors are beautiful,
taken by themselves, and the same is true of certain forms, which,
nevertheless, lack the element of variety. In the construction of
certain mathematical figures, which please the eye by their symmetry
and exactness, we may detect, perhaps, the operation of this principle.
On the other hand, it will not account for the pleasure we feel when
the eye rests upon a particular color that is agreeable. A bright red
pebble, or a bit of stained glass, appears to a child very beautiful.
It is the color that is the object of his admiration. We have simple
unity but no variety there. On the other hand, in a beautiful sunset we
have the greatest variety, but not unity, other than simply a numerical
unity.
We cannot, on the whole, accept this theory as a complete and
satisfactory resolution of the problem of the beautiful, although it is
supported by the eminent authority of Cousin, who, while he regards all
beauty as ultimately pertaining to the spiritual nature, still finds in
the principle, now under consideration, its chief characteristic so far
as it assumes external form.
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