_Reason for distinguishing the two._--As we distinguish, in philosophical investigation, between an emotion and the intellectual perception that precedes and gives rise to it, or between the perception and the sensation on which it is founded, so I would distinguish _taste_, or the intellectual perception of the beautiful, from the _sensation_ or _feeling_ awakened in view of the object. The fact that both elements exist, and enter into the series of mental phenomena in view of the beautiful, is no reason why they should both be designated by the same term, or included in the same definition, but, rather, it is a reason why they should be carefully distinguished. The precise nature of this faculty may be more distinctly perceived, if we consider, more particularly, its relation to the _judgment_, and also to the _sensibility_. _Taste, as related to Judgment._--According to the view now taken, taste is only a modification, or rather a particular direction of that general power of the mind which we call _judgment_; it is judgment exercised about the beautiful. It is the office of the judgment to form opinions and beliefs, to inform us of relations, to decide that things are thus and thus, that this is this, and that is that. As employed in different departments of thought, it appears under different forms, and is known under diverse names. As employed about the actual and sensible, we call it understanding; in the sphere of abstract truth it works under the cognomen of reason; in the sphere of practical truth, the thing that is good and right to be done by me, it is known as conscience; in the sphere of the ideal and the beautiful it is taste. In all these departments of mental activity it is exercised, employs itself upon all these subjects, giving us opinion, belief, knowledge, as to them all. The judgment as thus exercised in relation to the beautiful, that is to say, the mind observing, comparing, discriminating, deciding, forming the opinion, or reaching it may be the positive knowledge that this thing is, or is not, beautiful--for this is simply what we mean by judgment in any particular instance--judgment, as thus exercised, is known by the name of _taste_. More strictly speaking, it is not so much the _exercise_ of the judgment in this particular way in given instances, as the _foundation_ or _ground_ of that exercise, the _discriminating faculty_ or _power_ of the mind by virtue of which it thus operates.