Mental Philosophy: Including the Intellect, Sensibilities, and WillHaven, Joseph
Philosophy
Mental Philosophy: Including the Intellect, Sensibilities, and Will
Haven, Joseph
Psychology
_Properly an Emotion._--Among the sources of rational enjoyment which
the constitution of our nature affords, must be reckoned the feeling
awakened by the perception of the _ludicrous_. We class this among the
emotions, inasmuch as it is a matter of feeling, and of pleasurable
feeling, differing in its nature not more from the intellectual
faculties, on the one hand, than from the affections and desires, on
the other. It is a species of joy or gladness, a pleasurable excitement
of feeling, awakened by a particular class of objects. Whatever else
may be true of the feeling in question, the character of agreeableness
is inseparable from it. It falls, therefore, properly into that class
of feelings which comprises the various modifications of joy and
sorrow, and which we have denominated simple emotions.
_Why rational._--We term it _rational_, rather than instinctive,
inasmuch as it implies, if I mistake not, the exercise of the higher
intellectual faculties. It is the prerogative of reason. The brute
nature has no perception, and of course no enjoyment, of the ludicrous.
The idiot has none. The uncultivated savage nature has it only in a
slight degree. In this respect the feeling under consideration is quite
analogous to the enjoyment of the beautiful and sublime, and also to
the feeling awakened in view of right or wrong action, the approbation
or disapprobation of our past conduct. All these, though founded in
our nature and constitution, are rational rather than instinctive,
as implying the exercise of those faculties which more peculiarly
distinguish man from the lower orders of being.
_In what Way to be defined._--To define precisely the emotion of the
ludicrous would be as difficult as to give an exact definition of any
other feeling. We must content ourselves, as in all such cases, by
determining the circumstances or conditions which give occasion for the
feeling. Though we cannot define the emotion itself, we can carefully
observe and specify the various objects and occasions that give rise to
it.
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