Mental Philosophy: Including the Intellect, Sensibilities, and WillHaven, Joseph
Philosophy
Mental Philosophy: Including the Intellect, Sensibilities, and Will
Haven, Joseph
Psychology
In like manner, if it be not indeed the operation of the same
principle, cause suggests the effect, and effect its cause. The wound
reminds me of the instrument, and the instrument awakens the unpleasant
conception of the wound which it once inflicted.
_Why one Conception rather than another._--Inasmuch as any one
conception may awaken in the mind a great variety of other
conceptions--since a picture, for example, may recall the person
whose likeness it is, or the artist who painted it, or the friend who
possesses it, or the time and place in which it was sketched, or the
room in which it formerly hung, or any circumstance or event connected
with it--the question arises, why, in any given instance, is _one_ of
these conceptions awakened in the mind rather than any _other_ in its
stead? It is evident that the action of the associating principle is
not uniform, sometimes one conception being awakened, sometimes another.
_Secondary Laws._--In answer to this, Dr. Brown has shown that the
action of these general and primary laws of suggestion, now named,
is modified by a variety of circumstances, which may be called
_secondary_ laws of suggestion, and which will account for the
variety in question. These modifying circumstances are: 1. Continuance
of attention. 2. Vividness of feeling. 3. Frequency of repetition.
4. Lapse of time. 5. Exclusiveness of association. 6. Original
constitutional differences. 7. State of mind at the time. 8. State
of body. 9. Professional habits. Any one of these circumstances may
so modify the action of the primary laws of suggestion, that one
conception shall be awakened in the mind rather than another, by that
which has preceded.
_Correctness of this View._--There can be little doubt as to the
correctness of this view. The attention, for example, which a given
object or event excites at the time of its occurrence, and the strength
and liveliness of feeling which it awakened in us, have very much to
do, as every one knows, with our subsequent remembrance of that object
or event. So also has the frequency with which the train of thought
has been repeated--a fact illustrated in the process of committing to
memory.
The more frequently two things come together before the mind, the more
likely will it be, when one is again presented, to think of the other.
In the process of learning a thing by rote, we repeat the lines over
and over, until they become so associated, and linked together, that
the suggestion of one recalls the whole. Frequently, however, we find
it difficult to pass from one sentence to another, or from one stanza
or paragraph to another, while we find no difficulty in completing the
sentence or paragraph once commenced. The reason is, we have repeated
each sentence or stanza by itself in the process of learning, and have
not connected one with another. The last words of one sentence, and
the first words of another, have not been repeatedly conjoined in the
mind--have not frequently _coëxisted_.
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