Mental Philosophy: Including the Intellect, Sensibilities, and WillHaven, Joseph
Philosophy
Mental Philosophy: Including the Intellect, Sensibilities, and Will
Haven, Joseph
Psychology
_An additional Element._--The intuitions of sense, thus replaced in
the absence of the external objects, present themselves to the mind as
mere conceptions, involving no reference to ourselves as the perceiving
subject, nor to the time, place, and circumstances of the original
perception. But suppose now this latter element to be superadded to
the former; that along with the conception or recalling of the object,
there is also the conception of ourselves as perceiving, and of the
circumstances under which it was perceived; in a word, the recalling
of the _subjective_ along with the _objective_ element of the original
perception, and we have now that form of mental representation which we
term _recognitive_, or mental recognition.
_The two Forms compared and distinguished._--The two taken together,
the reproduction, and the recognition, constitute what is ordinarily
called memory, which involves, when closely considered, not only the
reproduction, in thought, of the former object of perception, but
also the consciousness of having ourselves perceived the same. The
conception is given as before, but it is no longer mere conception
in the abstract, standing by itself; it is connected now by links of
time, place, and circumstance, with our own personal history. It is
this _subjective_ element that constitutes the essential characteristic
of memory proper, or mental recognition, as distinguished from mere
conception, or mental reproduction.
_Specification of Time and Place._--It is not necessary that the
_specific time_ and _place_ when and where we previously perceived the
object, or received the impression, should be recalled along with the
object or impression; this may or may not be. More frequently, perhaps,
these do recur to the mind, and the object itself is recalled or
suggested by means of these specific momenta; but this is not essential
to the act of memory. It is enough that we recognize the representation
or conception, now before the mind, as, in general, an object of former
cognition, a previous possession of the mind, and not a new acquisition.
_Not of necessity voluntary._--Nor is it necessary to the fact of
memory, that this recurrence and recognition of former perceptions and
sensations, as objects of thought, should be the result of special
volition on our part. It may be quite involuntary. It may take place
unbidden and unsought, the result of casual suggestion.
_Distinction of Terms._--Memory is usually distinguished from
_remembrance_, and also from _recollection_. Memory is, more properly,
the power or faculty, remembrance the exercise of that power in
respect to particular objects and events. When this exercise is
voluntary--when we set ourselves to recall what has nearly or quite
escaped us, to _re-collect_, as it were, the scattered materials of our
former consciousness--we designate this voluntary process by the term
_recollection_. We recollect only what is at the moment out of mind,
and what we _wish_ to recall.
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