Metapsychical Phenomena: Methods and ObservationsMaxwell, J. (Joseph)
Philosophy
Metapsychical Phenomena: Methods and Observations
Maxwell, J. (Joseph)
Parapsychology -- Investigation
The result of these facts is that the personal consciousness is
manifested as a limitation of the general consciousness, of what I
will simply call _the consciousness_. The study of the alterations of
memory notably—diverse amnesiæ, hypermnesiæ, paramnesiæ—shows us that
those souvenirs of which the general and impersonal consciousness has
the free disposition are incomparably more numerous than those at the
disposal of the personal consciousness. This is incontestable as far
as memory is concerned; is it so with intelligence? It is hard to say;
there are, however, numerous examples of problems solved and of work
accomplished without the knowledge of the personal consciousness.
Anatomy and physiology inform us, that personal consciousness is
manifested in phenomena, which appear to have their seat in certain
regions on the surface of the cerebral hemispheres. The cortical
region seems to be appropriated, at least in part, by psychological
phenomena, of which personality is the centre, active memory,
attention, judgment, abstraction, will. It is for this reason that
this region is called ‘the superior centres.’ Underneath this region
the cerebral sub-cortical ganglions, the bulbous and medullary nuclei,
the sympathetic ganglions, and the plexus constitute the inferior
centres which preside over certain functions foreign to the personal
consciousness.
However, it must not be thought that the activity of the cortical
centres is always perceived by the personal consciousness. That of
the motor centres, for example, may exist unknown to the personal
consciousness. I have already given the indication of certain
complicated movements which can be voluntary and personally conscious
in the beginning, and become, in the end, unconscious and yet
voluntary; _e.g._ the playing of a musical instrument. Likewise,
certain involuntary movements can sometimes be perceived by the
personal consciousness; _e.g._ the rapid movement we make in chasing
away a fly which is worrying us. If the centre motors of the arm which
drives away the fly be sub-cortical or medullary, it is none the less
true that the movements executed, even when they appear to be pure
reflex movements, can sometimes be perceived.
Movements executed without the participation of the personal
consciousness and will are called _automatic_. This expression
signifies for me, that the voluntary activity of the personality
remains foreign to the movement executed.
Therefore, in the motor sphere, that is to say in movements, we
may have different relations between the movement executed and the
personal consciousness. We have, first of all, conscious and voluntary
movements; then involuntary or impulsive movements, perceived or
unperceived by the personal consciousness.
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