days, and Thomas evidently enjoyed, in his quiet way, the vivacious talk and brilliant ideas of his old friend, now his commander. His army so much outnumbered the organizations of McPherson and Schofield that, as a massive centre, it was necessarily the chief reliance of Sherman for the results of the campaign, and was personified in its leader's weight and deliberation; while the lighter organizations of the Tennessee and the Ohio were thrown from flank to flank in zigzag movements from one strategic position to another as we penetrated into Georgia. Grant's plan of having the armies of the East and West begin simultaneous movements on the first days of May had been responded to by Sherman with the information that on the first of the month his three armies were in mutual support, and that he would "draw the enemy's fire within twenty-four hours of May 5th." [Footnote: Official Records, vol. xxxviii. pt. iv. p. 1.] The delay in McPherson's reaching his position, slight as it was, had to be considered in ordering other movements in view of the promise to Grant to get into immediate contact with the enemy, and helped in the decision to let Thomas's army advance strongly in the centre and engage the enemy if the chance seemed at all favorable, while McPherson made the flanking movement by way of Snake Creek Gap. On the 4th Sherman had telegraphed Grant that he would "first secure the Tunnel Hill, then throw McPherson rapidly on his (the enemy's) communications, attacking at the same time cautiously and in force." [Footnote: _Id_., p. 25.] McPherson's orders went to him on the evening of the 5th, directing that whilst the movements of Thomas and Schofield already described were in progress, on Saturday the 7th he should "secure Snake Creek Gap, and from it make a bold attack on the enemy's flank or his railroad at any point between Tilton and Resaca." [Footnote: _Id_., p. 39.] Sherman expressed the hope that Johnston would fight at Dalton, but should he fall back along the railroad McPherson was to hit him in flank. "Do not fail, in that event," he continued, "to make the most of the opportunity by the most vigorous attack possible, as it may save us what we have most reason to apprehend, a slow pursuit, in which he gains strength as we lose it." McPherson was assured that Thomas and Schofield would prevent Johnston from turning on him alone, and the sound of battle at the north would show the greater necessity for rapid movement on the railroad. "If once broken to an extent that would take them days to repair, you can withdraw to Snake Creek Gap, and come to us or await the development according to your judgment or information you may receive." [Footnote: Official Records, vol. xxxviii. pt. iv. p. 39.]