In regard, again, to the second capital defect or error of his system, it may be conclusively shown that he confounds, or fails at least duly to discriminate, two things which are radically different, when he speaks as if the "physical and organic laws" of Nature had the same _authority_, and imposed the same obligations, as the "moral laws" of Conscience and Revelation, and as if the breach or neglect of the former were _punishable_, in the same sense, and for the same reason, as the transgression of the latter. The declared object of his treatise is twofold: first, to illustrate the relation subsisting between the "natural laws" and the "constitution of man;" and, secondly, to prove the _independent operation_ of these laws, as _a key to the explanation of the Divine government_. In illustrating the relation between the "natural laws" and the "constitution of man," he attempts to show that the natural laws require obedience not less than the moral, and that they inflict punishment on disobedience: "The peculiarity of the new doctrine is that these (the physical, organic, and moral laws) operate independently of each other; that each requires obedience to itself; that each, in its own specific way, rewards obedience and punishes disobedience; and that human beings are happy in proportion to the extent to which they place themselves in accordance with _all_ of these Divine institutions." In regard to these "natural laws,"--including the physical, the organic, the intellectual, and the moral,--_four_ positions are laid down: first, that they are independent of each other; secondly, that obedience or disobedience to each of them is followed by reward or punishment; thirdly, that they are universal and invariable; and, fourthly, that they are in harmony with the "constitution of man."[198] Now, in this theory of "natural laws," especially as it is applied to the doctrines of Providence and Prayer, there seem to be _three_ radical defects: 1. Mr. Combe speaks of _obedience_ and _disobedience_ to the "physical and organic" laws, as if they _could_ be obeyed or disobeyed in the same sense and in the same way as the "moral" laws, and as if they imposed an obligation on man which it would be sinful to disregard. He has not duly considered that the moral law differs from the physical and organic laws of Nature in two important respects: first, that while the former _may_, the latter _cannot_, be broken or violated by man; and secondly, that while the former does impose an imperative obligation which is felt by every conscience, the latter have either no relation to the conscience at all, or, if they have, it is collateral and indirect only, and arises not from the mere existence of such laws, but from the felt obligation of a _moral law belonging to our own nature_, which prescribes _prudence_ as a duty with reference to our personal conduct in the circumstances in which we are placed.