very few words, has shown that the theory of "natural laws," as taught by Mr. Combe, is true in one sense and false in another: "It is _true_, first, that the Creator has bestowed constitutions on physical objects; in other words, the constitutions which physical objects possess were _given_ them, given during His pleasure; secondly, that the constitutions of physical objects are _definite_,--that is, they are distinct, individual, and incapable of transmutation _by natural causes_; thirdly, that no power but the power of the Creator can vary their constitutions. But it is _not true_, first, that any mode of action of a physical object is otherwise inherent in it, than as it is the will of God that that object should _now_ present that mode of action. Nor is it true, secondly, that it is beyond the power of God to vary, when He pleases, either temporarily or permanently, the constitution of physical objects." He further shows that, on Mr. Combe's principle of "natural laws" being all equally Divine institutions which must be _obeyed_, "human obedience is a very complicated and perplexing affair, so complicated and so perplexing as to involve positive contradictions;" that "the very same act is required by one law, and forbidden by another, both laws being equally Divine;" and that "we sometimes cannot obey both the 'organic' and the 'moral' laws." He concludes that "physical laws ought not to be confounded with laws of human conduct;" that "these we always must obey, and those we may often, without deserving blame, boldly disregard;" and that "by commingling distinct classes of 'natural laws,' Mr. Combe introduces into his system dangerous error and gross absurdity."