government of "natural law," as contradistinguished from that of a "supernatural will." There is thus a manifest tendency to resile from the old theory of Chance, and to take refuge in the new asylum of Law, Order, or Destiny. There is, apparently, a wide difference between the two contrasted systems; and yet the difference may be, after all, more seeming than real: for both the old doctrine of "chance" and the new theory of "development" are compelled to assume certain conditions or qualities as belonging to the primordial elements of matter, without which it is felt that neither Chance nor Fate can afford a satisfactory account of the works either of Creation or Providence. The one party spoke more of "Chance," the other speaks more of "Law;" but both were compelled to feel that neither Chance nor Law could _of themselves_ account for the established order of Nature, without presupposing certain conditions, adjustments, and dispositions of matter, such as could only be satisfactorily explained by ascribing them to a wise, foreseeing, and designing Mind. In the present state of philosophical speculation, which evinces so strong a tendency to reduce everything to the dominion of "Law," it may seem unnecessary to refer to the doctrine of "Chance" at all; but believing as we do that there are, and ever must be, certain events in the course of life, and certain facts in the complex experience of man, which will irresistibly suggest the idea of it, even where the doctrine is theoretically disowned, we think it right to lay down a distinct and definite position on this subject, such as may serve, if duly established, at once to neutralize whatever is false and noxious in the doctrine of Chance, and at the same time to preserve whatever is true and wholesome in it, as having a tendency to illustrate the actual scheme of Divine Providence. And the position which we are disposed to state and prepared to establish is this: That, with reference to God, as an omniscient Being, there is, and there can be, no such thing as "Chance;" while, with reference alike to men and angels, many events may be fortuitous or accidental, not as being independent of causes, but as depending on causes unknown, or on combinations of causes whose joint operation may result in effects absolutely undiscoverable by our limited intelligence.