Here we need not stop to point out how thoroughgoing a Rousseauean is Spencer in his view of intellectual training. He is equally, if not more so, in his conception of the fundamental principles of moral culture. Only the English Empiricist does not agree with the French Romanticist in believing in the original goodness or innocence of the child; nor can he idealize, with the Swiss enthusiast, the educational capability of parental love; nor does he expect, with the German idealist-patriot, to be able to produce a new species of humanity out of the present imperfect society by the single instrument of a perfect system of education. According to him, “no system of moral culture can forthwith make children altogether what they should be; ... even were there a system that would do this, existing parents are too imperfect to carry it out; and even could such a system be successfully carried out, its results would be disastrously incongruous with the present state of society” (7: p. 171). Progress of the social organism necessarily must be organic and evolutionary; the improvement of family discipline must go together with that of every other institution of society. Yet this does not prevent us from “elaborating and recommending methods that are in advance of time.” The human race has learned rightness or wrongness of conduct by its total consequences, immediate and remote. “The happiness or misery caused by it are the ultimate standards by which all men judge of behavior” (7: p. 174). So in the case of individuals, their moral insight can only be truly developed by their experiencing the full bearing of each particular line of conduct. “Proper conduct in life is much better guaranteed when the good and evil consequences of actions are rationally understood, than when they are merely believed on authority” (7: p. 185). The function of parents as “ministers and interpreters of Nature” is to see that nothing more nor less than the full weight of the true, natural consequences of their children’s conduct should be always experienced by them. “It is a vice of the common system of artificial rewards and punishments, long since noticed by the clear-sighted, that by substituting for the natural results of misbehavior certain threatened tasks or castigations it produced a radically wrong standard of moral guidance. Having throughout infancy and boyhood always regarded parental or tutorial displeasure as the result of a forbidden action, the youth has gained an established association of ideas between such action and such displeasure, as cause and effect; and consequently, when parents and tutors have abdicated, and their displeasure is not to be feared, the restraint on a forbidden action is in great measure removed; the true restraints, the natural reactions, having yet to be learned by sad experience” (7: pp. 185-186).