Modern French Philosophy: a Study of the Development Since ComteGunn, John Alexander
Philosophy
Modern French Philosophy: a Study of the Development Since Comte
Gunn, John Alexander
Philosophy, French; Philosophy, Modern
In Bergson the difficulty which besets Ravaisson reappears more
markedly—namely, the relation of spirit and matter to one another, and
to the power at the heart of things, which, according to Bergson
himself, is a spiritual principle. Here we seem forced to admit
Ravaisson’s view of a “fall” or, as the theologians would say, a
“Kenosis” of the deity in order to create the material universe. Yet in
the processes of nature we see spirit having to fight against matter,
and of this warfare Bergson makes a great point. These considerations
lead to discussions which Bergson has not touched upon as yet. He does
not follow Ravaisson and Boutroux into the realm of theological ideas.
If he did he might have to make admissions which would compromise, or
at least modify, other doctrines expressed by him. He will have none of
Hegel or of the Absolute Idealism which sees the world process as a
development of a Divine Idea. It is new and it is creation; there is no
repetition. Even God himself _se fait_ in the process, and it may be,
suggests Bergson, that love is the secret of the universe. If so we may
well ask with Blondel, “If God _se fait_ in the process, then does he
not already exist and, in a sense, the process with him?” Instead,
however, of reverting to Ravaisson’s view of the whole affair being a
search for, and return to God, Bergson claims that the development is a
purely contingent one, in which a super-consciousness develops by
experiment and error.
Bergson’s God, if he may be so-called, is not so much a Creator, but a
power creative of creators—that is, human personalities capable of free
action. The Deity is immanent in man, and, like man, is ignorant of the
trend of the whole process. The universe, according to Bergson, is a
very haphazard affair, in which the only permanence is change. There is
no goal, and progress has little meaning if it be only and merely
further change, which may be equally regress rather than progress. To
live is not merely to change, but to triumph over change to set up some
values as of absolute worth, and to aim at realising and furthering
these. Apart from some philosophy of values the conception of progress
has little meaning.
Interesting discussions of various aspects of the problem are to be
found in the writings of the sociologist we have mentioned, Durkheim,
particularly _La Division du Travail sociale_, _Le Suicide_ and _Les
Formes élémentaires de la Vie religieuse_. There is an interesting
volume by Weber, entitled _Le Rythme du Progres_, and there are the
numerous books of Dr. Gustave Le Bon.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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