Modern French Philosophy: a Study of the Development Since ComteGunn, John Alexander
Philosophy
Modern French Philosophy: a Study of the Development Since Comte
Gunn, John Alexander
Philosophy, French; Philosophy, Modern
By a survey of laws of various types, logical, mathematical,
mechanical, physical, chemical, biological, psychological and
sociological, Boutroux endeavours to show that they are constructions
built up from facts. Just as nature offers to the scientist facts for
data, so the sciences themselves offer these natural laws as data to
the philosopher, for his constructed explanation of things which is
metaphysics or philosophy.
“In the actual condition of our knowledge,” he remarks, “science is not
one, but multiple; science, conceived as embracing all the sciences, is
a mere abstraction.” This is a remark which recalls Renouvier’s witty
saying, “I should very much like to meet this person I hear so much
about, called ‘science.’” We have only sciences, each working after its
own manner upon a small portion of reality. Man has a thirst for
knowledge, and he sees, says Boutroux, in the world an “ensemble” of
facts of infinite variety. These facts man endeavours to observe,
analyse, and describe with increasing exactness. Science, he points
out, is just this description.
It is futile to attempt a resolution of all things into the principle
of identity. “The world is full of a number of things,” and, therefore,
argues Boutroux, the formula A = B can never be strictly and absolutely
true. “Nature never offers to us identities, but only resemblances.”
This has important bearing upon the law of causality, of which the
sciences make so much. For there is such a degree of heterogeneity in
the things to which the most elementary and general laws of physics and
chemistry are applied that it is impossible to say that the consequent
is proportional to the antecedent—that is to say, it is impossible to
work out absolutely the statement that an effect is the unique result
of a certain invariable cause. The fundamental link escapes us and so,
for us, there is a certain contingency in experience. There is,
further, a creativeness, a newness, which is unforeseeable. The passage
from the inorganic to the organic stresses this, for the observation of
the former would never lead us to the other, for it is a creation, a
veritable “new” thing. Boutroux is here dealing hard blows at Taine’s
conception. He continues it by showing that in the conscious living
being we are introduced to a new element which is again absolutely
irreducible to physical factors. Life, and consciousness too, are both
creators. The life of the mind is absolutely _sui generis_; it cannot
be explained by physiology, by reflex action, or looked upon as merely
an epiphenomenon. Already Boutroux finds himself facing the central
problem of Freedom. He recognises that as psychological phenomena
appear to contain qualities not given in their immediate antecedents,
the law of proportion of cause to effect does not apply to the actions
of the human mind.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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