Beginning with a glowing confidence in the sciences as ultimate interpretations of reality, we thus have witnessed a complete turn of the tide during the develop-* since 1851. Also, in following out the changes in the attitude adopted to Science, we have been enabled to discover in a general manner that the central and vital problem which our period presents is that of Freedom. It will be interesting to find whether in regard to this problem, too, a similar change of front will be noticeable as the period is followed to its close. NOTE.—The reader may be interested to find that Einstein has brought out some of Boutroux’s points very emphatically, and has confirmed the view of geometry held by Poincaré. Compare the following statements: Boutroux: “Mathematics cannot be applied with exactness to reality.” “Mathematics and experience can never be exactly fitted into each other.” Poincaré: “Formulæ are not true, they are convenient.” Einstein: “If we deny the relation between the body of axiomatic Euclidean geometry or the practically rigid body of reality, we readily arrive at the view entertained by that acute and profound thinker, H. Poincaré . . . _Sub specie æterni_, Poincaré, in my opinion, is right” (_Sidelights on Relativity_, pp. 33-35). CHAPTER IV FREEDOM INTRODUCTORY: The central problem of our period—The reconciliation of science with man’s beliefs centres around the question of Freedom—Unsatisfactoriness of Kant’s solution felt. I. The positivist belief in universal and rigid determinism, especially shown in Taine. Renan’s view. II. Cournot and Renouvier uphold Freedom—Strong logical and moral case put forward for it. III. The new spiritualists, Ravaisson and Lacheher, set Freedom in the forefront of their philosophy—Fouillée attempts a reconciliation by the idea of Freedom as a determining force—Guyau, Boutroux, Blondel and Bergson insist on the reality of Freedom—They surpass Cournot and Renouvier by upholding contingency —This is especially true of Guyau, Boutroux and Bergson. Belief in creativeness and spontaneity replace the older belief in determinism. CHAPTER IV FREEDOM The discussions regarding the relation between science and philosophy led the thinkers of our period naturally to the crucial problem of freedom. Science has almost invariably stood for determinism, and men were becoming impatient of a dogmatism which, by its denial of freedom, left little or no place for man, his actions, his beliefs, his moral feelings. “_La nature fatale offre à la Liberté Un problème_.”[1] [1] Guyau, in his _Vers d’un Philosophe_, “_Moments de Foi_—I.,” _En lisant Kant_, p. 57. It was precisely this problem which was acutely felt in the philosophy of our period as it developed and approached the close of the century.