Thus it would seem that all virtues melt into one, and that one is what the late Professor Royce was fond of calling “loyalty,” the devotion of my will to the will of another. I am aware that not just _any_ other-will, whosesoever it may be, is contemplated by moralists as a fit object of loyalty’s devotion. The Other to whom my will should bow, if I would be moral, is generally conceived to be more numerous than I (_e.g._ the majority), or more inclusive (the family, the state, the cause), or in some sense higher (God). In short, the Other-will is taken to be, in one way or another, an Over-will, and moralists may differ widely as to which one of several conceivable Over-wills should be recognized as the Absolute. But for the purpose of this discussion, one illustration of moral loyalty is as good as another, for the difficulty that morality has found in making good its claim to have laid hold on the absolute good lies not, I conceive, in deciding _which_ Other-will is sovereign, but in convincing a man that he ought to acknowledge as sovereign _any_ other will than his own. One who is told that it is not good for him to remain captain of his soul is bound to ask, Why not? It is morality’s way of dealing with this _why_ that I would consider in an example which, for being simple, loses nothing that I can think essential to the issue. * * * * * In Thomas Hobbes’s “Leviathan,” one finds an account, clear, legalistic, unsentimental, of the meaning of duty interpreted as the obligation of your will and mine to bow to a Sovereign-will. The title-page of the first edition (1651) of this work bears the image of a man of heroic size whose body is made up of little men. The little men stand for you and me, the big man is Leviathan. The story of the generation of the living giant made up of living men is in this wise: “Nature it seems hath made men so equal ... as though there be found one man manifestly stronger in body or quicker in mind than another, yet when all is reckoned together the difference between man and man is not so considerable as that one man can therefore claim to himself any benefit to which another man may not pretend as well as he.... From this equality of ability arises equality of hope in attaining of our ends. And therefore if any two men desire the same thing, they become enemies, and in the way to their end ... endeavor to destroy or subdue one another.... From this diffidence of one another, there is no way for any man to secure himself so reasonable as anticipation; that is, by force or wiles to master the persons of all the men he can, so long till he see no other power great enough to endanger him....