In the case of those manufacturing monopolies in which a large fixed capital must be invested at the start by any new competitor, we have a much more difficult problem. It is true that in this case the monopoly itself has more at stake; and this may induce the starting up of new competitors simply to be bought out by the trust,--a sort of blackmailing operation which is certainly repugnant in its character. It might be possible to provide that rates charged by the monopoly must be so stable that a competitor would have a chance to establish itself before the monopoly could bring its own rates down. It might be possible to force the monopoly to keep all its factories in operation, and thus oblige it to keep down its price in order to dispose of its products; but there are evident practical difficulties in the way of enforcing such laws. It seems a great pity that just now, when to find some employment of prison convicts in some manner that will not "compete with free labor," and thus displease the labor interests, seems an impossibility, we cannot set the convicts at work to compete with the trusts and bring down their profits to a reasonable point. Surely the labor party would find no fault with this use of convict competition. There is one step, however, which we can take, and whose effect would certainly be very great; in its desirability, apart from questions of monopoly, all honest men are practically united. We can reform our laws regarding corporate management. It is a mild arraignment compared to what is deserved, to say that our present laws regarding the formation and management of corporations, taking the country as a whole, are a shame to the people and a disgrace to the men who made them. They seem designed to place a premium on fraud and knavery, and to assist the professional projector and stock manipulator in reaping gains from innocent--generally very innocent--stockholders. Now a real reform in our corporation laws would greatly simplify our work in controlling monopolies. Let us have no more stock-watering of any sort at any time in a corporation's life. Let us have no more "income bonds" which yield no income, and "preferred stock" in which another is preferred after all. Two classes of securities are enough for an honest corporation, and the public interest requires the charter of no other class of companies. Let us have done, too, with the iniquitous custom of one corporation holding another's stock or bonds. With a few such simple reforms as these effected, the holders of stock in our corporations would have some idea where they stand and what their securities represent, and would take some interest in the control of their property.