Previously, when reasoning on the means of human happiness, he declared it to be an established conclusion, that virtue leads to happiness, even in this life; now he bases his own theory on the uncertainty of that conclusion. His words are, 'They who would establish a system of morality, independent of a future state, must look out for some other idea of moral obligation, _unless they can show_ that virtue conducts the possessor to certain happiness in this life, or to a much greater share of it than he could attain by a different behaviour.' He does not make the obvious remark that _human_ authority, as far as it goes, is also a source of obligation; it works by the very same class of means as the divine authority. He next proceeds to enquire into the means of determining the WILL OF GOD. There are two sources--the express declarations of Scripture, when they are to be had; and the design impressed on the world, in other words, the light of nature. This last source requires him, on his system, to establish the Divine Benevolence; and he arrives at the conclusion that God wills and wishes the happiness of his creatures, and accordingly, that the method of coming at his will concerning any action is to enquire into the tendency of that action to promote or to diminish the general happiness. He then discusses UTILITY, with a view of answering the objection that actions may be useful, and yet such as no man will allow to be right. This leads him to distinguish between the _particular_ and the _general_ consequences of actions, and to enforce the necessity of GENERAL RULES. An assassin, by knocking a rich villain on the head, may do immediate and particular good; but the liberty granted to individuals to kill whoever they should deem injurious to society, would render human life unsafe, and induce universal terror. 'Whatever is expedient is right,' but then it must be expedient on the whole, in the long run, in all its effects collateral and remote, as well as immediate and direct. When the _honestum_ is opposed to the _utile_, the _honestum_ means the general and remote consequences, the _utile_ the particular and the near. The concluding sections of Book II. are occupied with the consideration of RIGHT and RIGHTS. A Right is of course correlative with an Obligation. Rights are Natural or Adventitious; Alienable or Inalienable; Perfect or Imperfect. The only one of these distinctions having any Ethical application is Perfect and Imperfect. The Perfect Rights are, the Imperfect are not, enforced by Law. Under the 'general Rights of mankind,' he has a discussion as to our right to the flesh of animals, and contends that it would be difficult to defend this right by any arguments drawn from the light of nature, and that it reposes on the text of Genesis ix. 1, 2, 3. As regards the chief bulk of Paley's-work, it is necessary only to indicate his scheme of the Duties, and his manner of treating them.