The foregoing is an abstract of the Introduction to the 4th Edition of the Elements of Morality. We shall present the author's views respecting the other questions of Morality in the form of the usual summary. I.--As regards the Standard, enough has been already indicated. II.--The Psychology of the Moral Faculty is given by Whewell as part of a classification of our Active Powers, or, as he calls them, Springs of Action. These are: I.--The _Appetites_ or Bodily Desires, as Hunger and Thirst, and the desires of whatever things have been found to gratify the senses. II.--The _Affections_, which are directed to persons; they fall under the two heads Love and Anger. III.--The _Mental Desires_, having for their objects certain abstractions. They are the desire of Safety, including Security and Liberty; the desire of Having, or Property; the desire of Society in all its forms--Family Society and Civil Society, under which is included the need of Mutual Understanding; the desire of Superiority; and the Desire of Knowledge. IV.--The _Moral Sentiments_. Our judgment of actions as right or wrong is accompanied by certain Affections or Sentiments, named Approbation and Disapprobation, Indignation and Esteem; these are the Moral Sentiments. V.--The _Reflex Sentiments_, namely, the desires of being Loved, of Esteem or Admiration, of our own Approval; and generally all springs of action designated by the word _self_--for example, self-love. With regard to the Moral Sentiment, or Conscience, in particular, the author's resolution of Morality into Moral Rules, necessarily supposes an exercise of the Reason, together with the Affections above described. He expressly mentions 'the _Practical_ Reason, which guides us in applying Rules to our actions, and in discerning the consequences of actions.' He does not allow Individual Conscience as an ultimate or supreme authority, but requires it to be conformed to the Supreme Moral Rules, arrived at in the manner above described. On the subject of Disinterestedness, he maintains a modification of Paley's selfish theory. He allows that some persons are so far disinterested as to be capable of benevolence and self-sacrifice, without any motive of reward or punishment; but 'to require that all persons should be such, would be not only to require what we certainly shall not find, but to put the requirements of our Morality in a shape in which it cannot convince men.' Accordingly, like Paley, he places the doctrine that 'to promote the happiness of others will lead to our own happiness,' exclusively on the ground of Religion. He honours the principle that 'virtue _is_ happiness,' but prefers for mankind generally the form, 'virtue _is the way_ to happiness.' In short, he places no reliance on the purely Disinterested impulses of mankind, although he admits the existence of such.